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DURING  THE FIRST  HALF  OF THE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY,  the growth  of 
output  per manhour  (hereafter  called  "labor  productivity")  was accelerat- 
ing. According  to Kendrick,  labor  productivity  grew  at an annual  rate of 
1.7 percent  over the 1899-1929  period,  and then at 2.4 percent  over the 
1929-57  period.'  The  acceleration  of the early  part  of the century,  however, 
was apparently  reversed  some time  in the postwar  period,  as the following 
table  shows:2 
Annual  growth  rate of 
Period  output  per manhour 
1948-55  3.11% 
1955-65  2.51 
1965-71  1.88 
Many explanations  have been offered  for the slowing trend in labor 
productivity.  Some  economists  cite a shift  in the composition  of output  to- 
* I am extremely  grateful  for an uncountable  number  of helpful comments and sug- 
gestions by participants  in the Brookings panel. Much of the computation  was done 
within  the TROLL system.  Any remaining  errors,  human or not, are my responsibility. 
1. See John W. Kendrick,  Productivity  Trends  in the United  States (Princeton  Uni- 
versity  Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961), Table 4, p. 72. A 
similar  result is found in Edward  F. Denison, The Sources  of Economic  Growth  in the 
United  States and the Alternatives  before Us, Supplementary  Paper 13 (Committee  for 
Economic  Development,  1962), p. 266. 
2. Source: Table 1 below. Here and in all subsequent  tables, rates of growth of 
variables  are given as first differences  of logarithms  (for example,  the rate of growth of 
X between 1948 and 1955 is [I  log(X55)  -  log(X48)}/7]). 
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ward  low productivity  industries,3  others  the changing  composition  of the 
labor force.4  Still others  argue  that there has been no slowdown  at all.5 
Whatever  their fundamental  explanations,  everyone  agrees  that the cycle 
plays  a part.  The  present  study  attempts  to sort  out the facts  and  determine 
what  is behind  the disappointing  performance  of labor  productivity. 
This  paper  is concerned  with growth  in measured  productivity,  which  in 
turn  depends  on output  measures  that are  not completely  adequate  from  a 
statistical  or conceptual  point of view.  In addition,  the input  measures  are 
very  primitive.  But most important,  movements  in gross  national  product 
cannot  be equated  with  movements  in economic  welfare.  The slippage  be- 
tween  the two concepts  is too great  to allow  the equation  of the growth  in 
potential  GNP with  the growth  in economic  well-being.  On the other  hand, 
the available  evidence  indicates  that productivity  growth  is perhaps  the 
most powerful  cause of the secular  rise in the growth  of per capita eco- 
nomic welfare.6 
Aggregate  Movements  in Labor  Productivity 
Before  examining  the behavior  of labor  productivity  in individual  indus- 
tries  I first  define  the concept  of normal  output  and consider  the question 
of aggregate  movements  in labor  productivity. 
NORMAL OUTPUT 
Because  cyclical  movements  in output  influence  productivity,  a cyclical 
correction  based  on the level of capacity  utilization  should  be introduced. 
3. See Victor R. Fuchs, The Service Economy  (Columbia University  Press for the 
National Bureau  of Economic Research, 1968); William  J. Baumol, "Macroeconomics 
of Unbalanced  Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis,"  American  Economic  Review, 
Vol. 57 (June 1967), pp. 415-26. 
4. See George L. Perry, "Labor Force Structure,  Potential Output, and Productiv- 
ity," Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (3:1971), p. 559. 
5. See, for example, "Prepared  Statement of Edward F. Denison," in Improving 
National Productivity,  Hearings before the Subcommittee  on Priorities  and Economy 
in Government  of the Joint Economic Committee,  92 Cong. 2 sess. (1972), p. 119; also 
see Denison's lengthy comment on Perry, "Labor Force Structure,"  Brookings  Papers 
on Economic  Activity  (3:1971), pp. 566-73. 
6. For a detailed  analysis  of the connection  between  GNP and a measure  of economic 
welfare, see William D. Nordhaus and James Tobin, "Is Growth Obsolete?"  in Eco- 
nomic Growth,  Fiftieth Anniversary  Colloquium  5 (Columbia University  Press for the 
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To estimate  aggregate  and industrial  utilization  this study  uses the notion 
of "normal  output,"  the level  that GNP would  attain  if the unemployment 
rate were  at its normal  level, defined  as its postwar  average  of 4.7 percent 
(using  the conventional  labor force definition).  The concept  is identical  to 
potential  output,  except  that the unemployment  rate target  is taken  to be 
the average  historical  rate  rather  than an estimate  of the minimal  noninfla- 
tionary  rate.  From an empirical  point of view, the only operational  differ- 
ence between  normal  output  and  potential  output  comes  in the projections 
of potential  output  like those in the final  section.  From a theoretical  point 
of view, certain  gains  accrue  from  using  the normal  output  concept,  espe- 
cially  in defining  capacity  utilization  for an industry. 
Estimates  of aggregate  normal  output  used here employ  the usual  tech- 
nique of adding  back a cyclical  correction  to observed  GNP. (The exact 
equation  for predicting  normal  output  is given  in Appendix  B.) The only 
substantive  issue concerns  the residuals  in the estimated  relationship  be- 
tween  actual  GNP and  the unemployment  rate.  I have  chosen  to include  the 
residuals  (in effect  making  normal  GNP equal  to actual  GNP plus the esti- 
mated  cyclical  correction),  because  any changes  in the underlying  growth 
rate of output,  such as the acceleration  in the late 1960s  due to the more 
rapid  growth  of the  labor  force,  should  also appear  in the estimated  growth 
of normal  output.  The danger  from  inclusion  of residuals  in the growth  of 
normal  output  is the possibility  of bias in the estimate  of the cyclical  pro- 
ductivity  coefficient.  Although  a complete  examination  of the properties  of 
the procedure  has not been  made,  it appears  that its use here  will yield an 
accurate  estimate  of the movement  of normal  output  if fluctuations  in the 
rate of growth  of output  are due largely  to changes  in inputs  or persistent 
changes  in the  rate  of growth  of labor  productivity;  on the other  hand,  inso- 
far  as the errors  are  due  to erratic  and  transient  changes  in productivity,  the 
assumption  will  bias  toward  unity  the estimates  of the cyclical  coefficients.7 
7. It was possible  to determine  the magnitude  of the possible bias by substituting  a 
series  on smoothed  normal  output for the unsmoothed  series.  The smoothed  series  was a 
scaled-down  version of the official  potential output series,  one that shows roughly  con- 
stant year-to-year  growth.  The same regressions  were  run as reported  below in Tables 1 
and 2. 
The secular  rates of productivity  growth  were virtually  identical.  The cyclical coeffi- 
cients differed  systematically  according  to the predictions  indicated  in the text. For the 
aggregate  relation  the sum of the cyclical  coefficients  (&oi)  was 0.90 rather  than 1.063.  For 
the disaggregated  coefficients  (5ii) the difference  was in the same  direction,  but amounted 
only to 0.088 on average.  If the entire  difference  between  the two estimates  were  bias, the 
difference  for year-to-year  residuals  (such as those in Table 5) would be at most 0.3 per- 496  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY 
In making  an estimate  of the growth  of aggregate  productivity  for com- 
parative  purposes,  I use the same  form  of estimation  applied  to individual 
industries  in the next section.  In particular,  I assume  that normal  labor  re- 
quirements  per  unit of normal  output  are  independent  of the size of normal 
output  and decline  exponentially  over  time. In addition,  I assume  that the 
percentage  deviation  of actual labor inputs from normal labor require- 
ments is proportional  to the percentage  deviation  of actual  from normal 
output.  This set of assumptions  leads to the following  equation  used for 
estimation  of the aggregate  productivity  relation: 
(1)  e-xn  =  bo  +  310(X-Xn)  +  320t + 
where 
e  log of manhours 
x  =  log of real GNP 
xn =  log of normal  real GNP 
t =  a linear time trend 
vo =  an error term.8 
centage  point. For the subperiod  productivity  growth  estimates  (such as those presented 
in Tables 4, 10, 13, 16, and 17) the estimates  from the two methods  differ  by an order of 
magnitude  of 0.05 percentage  point. 
What then are the probable  effects of use of the unsmoothed  normal output series? 
In the first  place, the true coefficients  lie somewhere  between  the estimates  using the un- 
smoothed  and smoothed  normal  output series.  The truth  lies closer to the former  or the 
latter in proportion  as year-to-year  movements  in normal  output were  caused by inputs 
or by erratic  changes  in productivity,  respectively.  Second,  the possible  bias of the cyclical 
coefficients  stemming  from using the unsmoothed  series  is systematically  upward,  with 
the order  of magnitude  being  around  0.1. Third,  the effect  on the estimated  and projected 
rate of productivity  growth  is slightly  pessimistic  since terminal  years  were years of low 
utilization.  Quantitatively,  the downward  bias in the estimate  of productivity  growth  for 
the period 1965-71 might be as high as 0.05 percent.  This would not alter substantially 
the result presented  below. 
8. The derivation  of the aggregate  production  relation  relies on developments  in the 
next section but the essentials  will be given here.  Let e, x, and xn be geometric  indices  of 
the log of employment,  output, and normal  output; xn is defined  as the prediction  from 
the following equation: 
(i)  X  =  Ko +  KI(U  -  Unarm)  +  K2t +  VO0 
where U is the actual unemployment  rate, Uiwrm  the normal  rate. Rewritten,  (i) becomes 
(ii)  xn  =  x  -  -K(  U-rm) 
Now, constructing  geometric  indices,  e, x, and xn using  weights  oi, 
(iii)  e  =  -eVi,  x  =  2xSiO,  xn  =  YxnOi. William  D. Nordhaus  497 
Table  1. Regression  Estimates  for Aggregative  Productivity  Equation, 
1948-1971a 
Independent  variables  Coefficient  Stanidard  error  t-statistic 
Constant  -8.687  ...  ... 
Time  -0.02567  0.000385  66.7 
Log (GNP/normal GNP)  0.796  0.095  8.38 
Log (GNP/normal GNP)-1  0.267  0.097  2.76 
R2 =  0.996  Standard  error  of estimate  =  0.0130  Durbin-Watson  statistic =  0.74 
Sources: Derived from equation (1) discussed in the text. See Appendix B for sources of the basic data, 
which are on an annual basis. 
a.  The dependent variable is log (manhours/normal GNP). Normal GNP is the level that would be at- 
tained if the unemployment rate were at its normal level, defined as its postwar average of 4.7 percent. The 
residuals are shown in Table 9. 
The  data  for  this  specification  are  simply  the aggregates  of the  individual  in- 
dustry  data,  and they  therefore  share  their  sins and virtues. 
The results  for the aggregate  equation  are shown  in summary  form in 
Table 1. Residuals  are shown  under  the heading  "aggregate"  in Table 9. 
The  most important  feature  of the estimate  is that, according  to this simple 
specification,  labor productivity  did indeed  fall below its trend value be- 
ginning  in 1969.  The shortfall  is not particularly  alarming;  it lies, in fact, 
within  the prediction  range  of two standard  errors  of estimate.  Starting  in 
1966  and  in every  year  until 1971,  the growth  in labor  productivity  was  less 
than  the trend  rate.  In 1971  labor  productivity  grew  at a rate  slightly  above 
the postwar  average. 
In order  to check  the results  for the annual  equation  shown  in Table 1, I 
also estimated  equation  (1) using  constructed  quarterly  data  for the period 
1949:1  to 1972:2.9  No important  differences  appeared  between  the quar- 
terly  and  annual  results.  The  coefficients  on the utilization  rate  were  slightly 
From (iii) and (7) in the next section, 
(iv)  22eiOi  -  I;xn,9  = -2;oi0  +  26ji(xi  -  xnj)Oj  +  ?6200ti  +  IeA, 
or 
(v)  e-xn  =  60  ?r  6;(x-xn)  +  &'t +?e', 
where  the As are suitably  averaged  aggregate  parameters,  assuming  the 3li and (xi-xn1) 
are uncorrelated.  Equation  (v) differs  from equation  (1) in the text in that the aggregate 
variables  in (1) are logarithms  of arithmetic  indices,  whereas  the aggregates  in equation 
(v) are logarithms  of geometric  indices. 
9. Because  quarterly  data on employment  by establishment  are not available  for the 
period, they had to be constructed.  The quarterly  interpolation  of the annual data was 
made using labor force survey data on average  hours worked and total employment. 
The quarterly  data were  constrained  to average  to the annual  manhour  data used in the 
annual aggregate  and industry  equation. 498  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
better  determined  for the quarterly  equation,  but the sum  remained  close  to 
unity.  The  annual  residuals  were  virtually  identical  in the two equations,  as 
were  the sums of squared  annual residuals.  There  was no decrease  in the 
residual  for 1972  apparent  in the quarterly  residuals,  as of the second  quar- 
ter. In short,  the annual  estimates  shown  in Table 1 are confirmed  by the 
quarterly  data. 
Measurement  of Labor  Productivity  by Industry  Groups:  The Model 
In assessing  recent  trends  in labor  productivity,  the most  important  ques- 
tion is whether  the recent  slowdown  is associated  with (a) changes  in the 
composition  of output;  (b) sharp  declines  in labor  productivity  growth  in a 
few isolated  sectors;  or (c) a decline  in productivity  growth  broadly  based 
in virtually  all sectors.  The  first  step  is to outline  a technique  for measuring 
labor  productivity  in the major  industries  to help  determine  which  of these 
possibilities  is correct. 
CYCLICAL  CORRECTION 
The  problem  of correcting  for the normal  cyclical  movements  of produc- 
tivity  has no easy solution.  Clear  evidence  exists  that short-run  increasing 
returns  arise from short-run  movements  in output. While in aggregate 
studies,  cyclical  changes  are  customarily  corrected  by using  a proxy  such  as 
the aggregate  unemployment  rate,  this  procedure  is not adequate  for indus- 
trial  productivity.10  GNP forthcoming  at a 4 percent  unemployment  rate 
may  well  be a reasonable  measure  of potential  output  in a labor-constrained 
economy;  but no similar  constraint  binds  a single  industry,  which  can bid 
away  labor  and materials  from other  industries  until it runs  into excessive 
costs or physical  limitations  on output. 
By and  large,  most  studies  of disaggregated  productivity  movements  have 
been  unable  to purge  the cyclical  elements  from  the estimates  of trend  pro- 
ductivity.  The procedure  used here  introduces  the concept  of "normal  in- 
dustrial  demand,"  defined  as that level of industrial  demand  that would  be 
forthcoming  if aggregate  demand  were  at its normal  level. Specifically,  ac- 
10. The first  use of this technique  was by Arthur  M. Okun. See his "Potential  GNP: 
Its Measurement  and Significance,"  reprinted  in his The  Political  Economy  of Prosperity 
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tual demand  is assumed  to be determined  by aggregate  output,  the utiliza- 
tion rate of aggregate  output,  and relative  prices.  Normal demand  is then 
the prediction  of that  relation  when  aggregate  demand  is at its normal  level. 
THE MODEL 
Seven  specific  assumptions  for each  industry  underlie  the analysis:11 
First,  the demand  for each  sector  is a function  of its price  relative  to the 
general  price  level, the unemployment  rate relative  to the normal  unem- 
ployment  rate,  and the level of normal  aggregate  output: 
(2)  x,  -= ao +  ali(pi  -  p) +  a2(U  -  Unorm)  +  a3iXFn  +  V1, 
where 
xi=  log of gross  product  originating  by industry  in 1958  prices 
Pi =  log of deflator for xi 
U =  the actual  unemployment  rate 
Unorm  = the normal  unemployment  rate 
xn = log of normal  aggregate  GNP in 1958  prices 
p = log of a geometric  index  of prices  using  1958  output  weights. 
The  conventions  followed  are  that  uppercase  letters  are  in natural  units  and 
lowercase  letters  are in natural  logarithms. 
Second,  estimates  are  then made  of normal  demand  for a given  industry 
from  equation  (2) on the basis of what  demand  would  have  been if aggre- 
gate output  had been at its normal  level,  that is, if U =  UnOrm.  This  implies 
the following  definition  of xni, (the log of) normal  demand: 
(3)  xni  =  aoi +  ai,(pi  -  p)  +  ao3iXn. 
Note that the residuals  are excluded  from  the definition  of normal  output. 
Further,  given  the identity 
12 
XN= =  XNiq 
i=l 
there  is one redundant  equation.  Industry  10 (finance,  insurance,  and real 
estate)  was considered  the residual  sector  because  of its treatment  in the 
construction  of the industrial  accounts  (see pp. 506-07). 
11. Exact definitions  of data are given in Appendix  B. The twelve industries  are agri- 
culture; mining; contract construction; nondurable  manufacturing;  durable manufac- 
turing; transportation;  communication;  public utilities; trade; finance, insurance,  and 
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The third stage in the argument  concerns  the growth of capacity  and 
"normal  output."  Firms  are assumed  to calculate  the path of demand  ac- 
cording  to the methods  outlined  in the first  and second  steps,  that is, to be 
aware  of the nature  of demand  for their  output.  Such  awareness  involves 
knowledge  that sales have a cyclical  component,  that relative  price  affects 
demand,  and that the economy  is growing.  In making  long-run  decisions, 
however,  firms are assumed  to keep their eye on normal sales, or sales 
cyclically  corrected.  They  do not, in this view,  expect  a current  recession  to 
last indefinitely.  They  then construct  capacity  so that "normal  output"  co- 
incides  with "normal  demand."  Normal  output  (QNi) is assumed  to follow 
a Cobb-Douglas  production  function: 
(4)  qni =  i +  flien,  +  f2iki +  f3it  +  v20, 
where 
qn, =  log of normal output 
en, =  log of normal labor input 
k, =  log of net capital stock 
t =  time; 
13i  iS  interpreted  as the secular  rate of growth  of total factor  productivity. 
By the assumption  that normal  output  adjusts  instantaneously  to normal 
demand,  it follows from  (4) that 
(4a)  xn, = Os +  Olieni  +  2ikk  +  f3it  +  V2i. 
Fourth,  I estimate  below  the full  model  suggested  by (4). Given  the prob- 
lems of obtaining  reasonably  accurate  and  complete  data  on capital,  I have 
made  the assumption  that normal  capital-labor  ratios  (Ki/ENi) grow  at a 
constant  exponential  rate  f4i,  and that there  are constant  returns  to scale, 
so that  li+  132i  =  1. These  imply  that 
(5)  eni = xni  -O  -  (33i +  34s2i)t  -  V2P 
Fifth,  for normal  labor  inputs,  manhours  are  assumed  to adjust  to short- 
run demand  according  to the following  relationship: 
(6)  e-  eni =  i(x  -xni)  +  v3i, 
where  ei is short-run  labor  inputs  or employment,  and 6l is the short-run 
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Sixth,  solving  (5) and (6) yields 
(7)  e-  xn, = bo,  +  1l(x  -  xnn)  +  52it  +  E-, 
where 
8Oi  =  30i  82i  =  33i  -  134i132i  Ei-  -V2i  +  V3i. 
The assumptions  represented  in equation  (7) permit  estimation,  by indus- 
try, of (a) the short-run  productivity  coefficient,  and (b) the secular  rate of 
growth  of labor productivity.  It is important  to note that the growth  of 
labor  productivity  has two components:  the secular  rate  of growth  of total 
factor  productivity  (033,)  and the contribution  of capital  deepening  (/84d32  ). 
Seventh,  for the price  equation  required  for projections,  price  is assumed 
to be a markup  over  normal  unit  labor  costs, plus a trend: 
(8)  pi-  wi-  eni +  xni = Toi  +-ylit  +  v4i 
where  w, is the log of the wage rate. 
Productivity  Estimates  by Industry 
The following  sections  present  the basic  results  of the analysis  for twelve 
industries.  The regressions  for equation  (7) are  shown  in Table  2.12 
CYCLICAL  PRODUCTIVITY 
First, the phenomenon  of short-run  increasing  returns  shows up fairly 
consistently  across  the board.  The estimates  of bli in equation  (7)-the  co- 
efficient  on capacity  utilization-generally  lie between  zero and one, indi- 
12. Here, as elsewhere,  the results sometimes  indicate significant  autocorrelation  of 
residuals,  generally  when there has been considerable  deceleration  or acceleration  in the 
secular  growth  of labor productivity.  Table 2 indicates  that the assumption  of a constant 
rate of growth is incorrect for mining, construction, transportation,  public utilities, 
FIRE, and services, which have the most serious problems with autocorrelation  of 
errors. 
To determine  the impact of this misspecification,  the basic equations  were also run 
with correction of first-order  autocorrelation.  For the most part the results were un- 
changed.  No drastic  changes  appeared  in the cyclical coefficients,  although  the standard 
errors  were generally  smaller.  Only three of the 62i  coefficients  changed  by more than 5 
percent. Construction  rose to 0.0118, transportation  fell to 0.0311, and FIRE fell to 
0.0150. For the 62i,  the standard  errors  are generally  50 percent  to 150 percent  larger 
where the correction for autocorrelation  is made. It seems unlikely that any major 
changes in the results  below would be occasioned  by such changes. 502  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Table  2. Coefficients  for Labor  Productivity  Equations,  1948-71 
Decline in 
Con-  Cyclical  manhour  re-  Standard Durbin- 
stant  produc-  quirements,  error  of  Watson 
Industry  (i)  (6Oo)  tivity  (63i)  1948-71  (62,)  estimate  statistic  R2 
Agriculture  9.48  0.476  -0.0533  0.0132  1.28  0.999 
(0.136)  (0.00039) 
Mining  7.82  1.080  -0.0375  0.0317  0.47  0.988 
(0.136)  (0.00094) 
Construction  8.83  1.480  -0.0090  0.0800  0.23  0.608 
(0.374)  (0.0024) 
Nondurable  manu-  8.55  0.923  -0.0314  0.0130  1.05  0.997 
facturing  (0.0749)  (0.00039) 
Durable manu-  8.49  0.830  -0.0251  0.0242  1.06  0.986 
facturing  (0.058)  (0.00072) 
Transportation  8.53  0.575  -0.0332  0.0337  0.85  0.982 
(0.145)  (0.0010) 
Communication  8.27  1.242  -0.0565  0.0374  0.54  0.992 
(0.351)  (0.0011) 
Public utilities  7.79  0.413  -0.0547  0.0320  0.52  0.994 
(0.149)  (0.00094) 
Trade  8.80  0.433  -0.0273  0.0160  1.42  0.994 
(0.150)  (0.00047) 
FIRE"  7.47  0.717  -0.0167  0.0331  0.46  0.935 
(0.270)  (0.00098) 
Services  9.09  0.548  -0.0095  0.0187  0.82  0.938 
(0.123)  (0.00055) 
Government  9.05  0.974  0.0014  0.0076  1.32  0.980 
(0.0309)  (0.00023) 
Source: Derived from equation (7) discussed in the text. See Appendix B for sources of the basic data. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
a.  In this and other tables, FIRE covers finance, insurance, and real estate. 
cating  that a 1 percent  rise  in output  leads  to a less than  proportional  rise  in 
manhours.  Three  industries-mining,  construction,  and communication- 
are  exceptions  to this rule. 
Six of the twelve  industries  show significant  increasing  returns:  agricul- 
ture, durable  manufacturing,  transportation,  public utilities, trade, and 
services.  The remainder  display  no significant  departure  from  constant  re- 
turns;  no industry  has significant  decreasing  returns.'3 
Is there any pattern  in these results?  Short-run  increasing  returns  are 
13. The precise  definition  of these is: for increasing  returns-(a) ali -  24(81) < 1; for 
decreasing  returns-(b)  Ali -  20(81i)  >  1; and for no significant  departure-neither (a) 
nor (b). Here Sli are  the estimated  coefficients  and &(a1j)  are  the estimated  standard  errors 
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often attributed  to the presence  of considerable  overhead  labor as well as 
to inflexibility  in hiring  and firing  workers  in the short  run. Is the cyclical 
responsiveness  of productivity  then associated  with the extent  of overhead 
labor?  Unfortunately,  no measure  reports  reliably  the extent to which a 
worker  is not "overhead."  One  measure  is the fraction  of workers  classified 
as production  or nonsupervisory  workers,14  another  the ratio of total em- 
ployees  to total employment.15  The relation  between  the fraction  of over- 
head  workers  (as measured  in these  two ways)  and  an industry's  cyclical  re- 
sponse  is shown  in Table  3. The  regressions  reported  at the bottom  of Table 
3 suggest  that  the extent  of cyclical  response  does not depend  in a predict- 
able way on the proportion  of nonoverhead  workers.16 
It is useful  to compare  the  estimates  of cyclical  productivity  for  individual 
industries  with  the aggregate  equation.  The  coefficient  on the aggregate  pro- 
ductivity  estimate  is a composite  of a fixed  term and a composition  term. 
From  note  8,  bl0(x -  xn) =  -,i(xi  -xnj)0j.  Let ZN,  be  the  normal 
share of industry i (ZNi  =  XNi/XN  or zni =  xni -  xn). Thus xi  -  xni = 
xi-zn-x  +  x-  xn  (x-zni-  x) +  (x-xn).  The  first  term 
(xi  -  zni -  x) is the deviation of the log of the share of the ith industry 
from  its normal  share,  whereas  the second  term  (x -  xn) is simply  the log 
of the deviation  of actual  from normal  aggregate  output.  Thus the com- 
posite cyclical coefficient  (610)  can be divided into two terms, first, the 
"composition"  effect, and second,  the "weighted  average"  disaggregated 
effect: 
alo(x  -  xn) =  81i(x  -  zni -  x)Oi  +  [ESj10J(x  -  xn). 
composition  weighted  average 
term  term 
14. For the exact definition  of a production  worker,  see Appendix  B. 
15. This second measure assumes that employees are relatively  less a fixed factor 
than self-employed  workers. Given the discrepancies  in definitions of production or 
nonsupervisory  workers,  it seems  useful  to try this second concept. For the exact defini- 
tion, see Appendix  B. 
16. One suspicious result is the significant  increasing  returns for agriculture.  The 
specification  is probably  at fault here.  The formulation  assumes  that firms  choose labor 
inputs in response to an output target, where output is determined  by an exogenous 
level of sales. In this scheme, the firm's errors  in estimating  productivity  will not bias 
the estimates.  Whereas  such a framework  is reasonable  in the industrial  sector, where 
firms are price setters, this procedure  is clearly inappropriate  for agriculture.  It seems 
much more likely that shifts in supply  factors  (weather,  corn-hog  cycles, and so on) are 
at work than shifts in demand  factors. If this is the case, relatively  large shifts in output 
will occur with little corresponding  movement  in employment,  giving a downward  bias 
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Table  3. Cyclical  Productivity,  and  Proportions  of Production  Workers 
and  Employees,  1964 
Production 
workers  as  Employees  as 
Cyclical  proportion  of  proportion  of 
productivity  total employees, total  employment, 
Industry  (31)  1964a  1964b 
Construction  1.48  0.85  0.80 
Communication  1.24  n.a.  0.99 
Mining  1.08  0.78  0.95 
Nondurable  manufacturing  0.92  0.75  0.97 
Durable manufacturing  0.83  0.73  0.97 
FIRE  0.72  0.81  0.88 
Transportation  0.58  n.a.  0.93 
Services  0.55  0.92  0.83 
Agriculture  0.48  n.a.  0.36 
Trade  0.43  0.89  0.84 
Public utilities  0.41  n.a.  0.98 
Sources: Column 1 is from Table 2 above: column 2 is from Manpower  Report of the Prestdent, 1972, 
p. 216. For employees as a fraction of total employment, see Appendix B. 
The regressions are 81 = 0.317 +  0.549 (production workers as fraction of total employees) R2 = 0.077 
(0.634) 
= 2.24 -  1.68  (employees as fraction of total employment)  R2  = 0.118 
(2.07) 
a.  Ratio of production or nonsupervisory  workers to total employees. 
b.  Ratio of (a) employees in the specific industry to (b) employees plus self-employed plus unpaid family 
workers in that industry. 
n.a. Not available. 
Following are the weighted  average  terms  (calculated  using 1958 output 
weights)  and the composition  terms  determined  residually  :17 
Aggregate  (a10)  0.903 
Weighted  average  term  0.747 
Composition  term  0.156 
As can be seen,  the aggregate  estimate  shows  less cyclical  sensitivity  than 
the weighted  sum  of the disaggregated  estimates  because  of the  composition 
17. This table is derived from the composition and weighted average  terms of the 
composite cyclical productivity equation discussed in the text. See Appendix B for 
sources  of the basic data. The aggregate  coefficient  (6,1) is different  from the sum shown 
in Table 1. For purposes  of comparison  with the disaggregated  equations,  the aggregate 
equation  was run with the lagged  term omitted,  giving  0.903 rather  than the 1.063  shown 
in Table 1. 
This calculation misses the effect of differential  productivity  levels on the cyclical 
coefficient.  The weighted  average  term uses output  weights  (Oi  in the notation of note 8) 
for all series.  This implicitly  assumes  productivity  levels are the same  in all industries,  so 
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term.  The composition  term  is positive  because  industries  in which  demand 
is cyclically  sensitive  also show productivity  that is cyclically  insensitive. 
Ranked  in order  of their short-run  income elasticity,  the industries  most 
sensitive  to demand  are  durable  goods manufacturing,  transportation,  and 
mining,  and they are third,  fifth, and seventh,  respectively,  in cyclical  pro- 
ductivity  insensitivity.  Services,  trade,  and public  utilities  are  practically  at 
the bottom of the list in both productivity  sensitivity  and demand  insensi- 
tivity. 
SECULAR  PRODUCTIVITY 
The  general  trend  of productivity  advance  for each  industry  is also  shown 
in Table 2. The coefficients  62i represent  the estimated  annual  rate of de- 
cline in manhour  requirements  per unit of normal  output  over the period 
1948-71.  The estimates  accord  with  those of other  studies. 
RECENT EXPERIENCE 
Are individual  industries  experiencing  the same slowdown  in produc- 
tivity  that  is apparent  in the aggregate?  Table  4 shows  the actual  and cycli- 
cally corrected  rates  of growth  of labor productivity  for three subperiods 
of the years 1948-71.  The last column shows the estimate  from Table 2. 
These  data reveal  a significant  deceleration  in five  industries  (mining,  con- 
struction,  durable  manufacturing,  public utilities,  and FIRE); significant 
acceleration  in two industries  (transportation  and services),  and no sig- 
nificant  pattern  in five industries  (agriculture,  nondurable  manufacturing, 
communication,  trade,  and government).  As it turns  out, the cyclical  cor- 
rection  does  not change  the  pattern  of results  significantly.  The only  serious 
changes  are  for construction,  where  the decline  in labor  productivity  looks 
even worse before correcting  for the cycle; for durable  manufacturing, 
where the deceleration  is attenuated  by the cyclical  correction;  and for 
services,  where  more acceleration  is apparent. 
Finally,  the residuals  from  each  industrial  equation  are  given  in Table  5; 
residuals  that  lie more  than one standard  error  away  from  the predictions 
are marked  with asterisks. 
The combined  results  in Tables  4 and 5 make  clear  that growth  in labor 
productivity  has been deteriorating  in four  industries.  The most notable  is 
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Table 4.  Actual and Cyclically Corrected  Growth of Output per Manhour, 
Subperiods  1948-71 
1948-55  1955-65  1965-71  1948-71 
Esti- 
Cycli-  Cycli-  Cycli-  mate 
cally  cally  cally  from 
cor-  cor-  cor-  equation 
Industry  Actual  rected  Actual  rected  Actual  rected  (7) 
Agriculture  5.03  5.20  5.33  5.29  5.20  5.20  5.33 
Mining  4.93  4.88  3.38  3.33  2.53  2.57  3.75 
Construction  4.70  4.71  -0.01  -0.05  -0.87  -0.18  0.90 
Nondurable 
manufacturing  3.21  3.29  3.16  3.15  3.60  3.66  3.14 
Durable manu- 
facturing  3.18  3.11  2.59  2.39  1.93  2.33  2.51 
Transportation  2.01  2.07  3.58  3.06  3.14  3.02  3.32 
Communication  5.13  5.00  6.24  5.05  4.28  4.21  5.65 
Public utilities  7.19  7.00  5.20  5.35  4.27  4.32  5.47 
Trade  2.91  3.05  2.64  2.62  2.23  2.54  2.73 
FIRE  1.64  1.79  2.31  1.01  -0.39  -0.28  1.67 
Services  0.47  1.30  0.79  0.51  1.34  1.74  0.95 
Government  -0.18  -0.18  -0.05  -0.23  -0.18  -0.20  -0.14 
Aggregate  3.11  ...  2.51  ...  1.88  ...  2.57 
Sources: The "actual" estimates are calculated directly from the data (see Appendix B). The cyclically 
corrected rates use the predicted rate of growth of productivity in Table 2, minus the average annual rate 
of change of the residual from each industrial equation. The last column is from Table 2. 
also has a very  pronounced  deterioration,  and mining  and public  utilities 
evidence  a slightly  less pronounced  pattern.  How seriously  should  we take 
these  results?  I think  that those for construction  and FIRE, which  are the 
most pronounced,  should  be used with great  caution.  The deflation  pro- 
cedures  used for construction  are known to be seriously  defective  in that 
they rely heavily  on input cost data. Given the method  of deflation,  and 
especially  the putative  improvement  in deflators  recently,  the change  in the 
estimated  rate of productivity  increase,  from 4.7 percent  in the 1948-55 
period  to -0.2  percent  in the 1965-71  period,  poses a puzzle.  Perhaps  a 
change  in the composition  of output  in construction  is responsible  for the 
shift,  or perhaps  it is an oddity  due  to the effects  of double  deflation.  I know 
of no corroborating  evidence  of such a dramatic  slowdown. 
As for the FIRE  industry,  there  are  three  reasons  to question  the validity 
of the results.  First, simply  from a technical  point of view, FIRE is the 
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Table 5.  Residuals from Labor Productivity  Equations, by Industry, 
1964-71a 
Percent 
Industry  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
Agriculture  1.17  0.98  0.07  -3.07b  -0.02  0.59  0.02  1.78b 
Mining  -2.12  0.97  -2.26  -2.69  -1.31  2.14  3.82b  8.04b 
Construction  -3.84  -0.62  3.32  4.17  3.18  7.32  8.51b  1O.19b 
Nondurable 
manufac- 
turing  -1.10  -0.34  0.40  2.17b  0.64  0.15  -0.39  _3.44b 
Durable man- 
ufacturing  -2.83b  -3.61b  -0.62  1.26  -0.07  1.03  1.69  -  2. 50b 
Transportation 0. 11  -1.79  _3.53b  -2.04  -1.96  -1.56  -0.04  0.04 
Communica- 
tion  -4.07b  -3.65  -1.40  -2.40  -2.33  0.71  5.33b  5.01b 
Public 
utilities  -  3.76b  -2.54  -2.36  -1.51  -0.14  3.69b  6.73b  4.37b 
Trade  -1.21  -0.56  -1.46  -1.01  -  1.66b  0.62  1.58  0.60 
FIRE  -2.76  -  4.82b  -  4.47b  -  5.56b  -3.18  3.43b  5.89b  6.87b 
Services  2.91b  1.68  0.72  -1.16  -2.16b  -1.29  -1.42  -  3.07b 
Government  -  1.39b  -1.  llb  1.5lb  0.91b  -0.22  -0.87b  -0.39  -0.75 
Sources: Same as Table 2. 
a.  The interpretation of residuals is the percentage excess of the logarithm of actual manhours over that 
of estimated manhours, e,(t)  - e,(t).  Thus a positive residual in recent years indicates that productivity 
growth has slowed. 
b.  Observation is more than one standard error away from predictions. 
lative  errors  of other  industries.  In fact, the normal  output  series  for FIRE 
is not as absurd  as it might  be, but it does wobble  more  than is plausible. 
Second,  FIRE is conceptually  odd, in that  it includes  a very  heavy  share  of 
imputed  returns  to owner-occupants  and to financial  institutions.  The im- 
portant  point  here  is that  the entire  return  from owner-occupied  dwellings 
is imputed  to capital  and  none at all to the  labor  service  component.  As any 
homeowner  knows, this assumption  is exasperatingly  contrary  to fact. 
Finally,  FIRE  is something  of a residual  category  in the construction  of the 
industry  accounts.  When  the residual  in the estimate  of aggregate  real  out- 
put using  the industrial  approach  is too widely  different  from  the aggregate 
real  output  estimate  using  the product  approach,  some  undetermined  frac- 
tion of the residual  is buried  in the FIRE sector  by adjusting  the deflator 
and therefore  the estimate  of the real output  in that sector. 
For mining and public utilities,  the causes of the recent  deterioration 
cannot  be laid to the quality  of the output  data. Conceivably,  new legisla- 
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tougher  environmental  standards  may have had a similar  effect  for public 
utilities. 
The recent  trend  in services  is encouraging  if these  figures  can be taken 
seriously.  Given  the method  of deflation,  however,  I am inclined  to ques- 
tion that any real  acceleration  has occurred.'8  Since  only a quarter  of out- 
put can be considered  properly  measured,  the productivity  movements  in 
services  are  implausibly  large. 
Further  Determinants  of Productivity 
The  model  outlined  above  uses  highly  simplified  production  relations.  No 
attempt  was  made  to introduce  capital  or materials,  lags or breaks  in trend, 
or demographic  variables.  Do any of these  constitute  gross  omissions  that 
compromise  the conclusions  of the model? 
LAGGED  RESPONSE TO OUTPUT 
The model assumes  that manhours  respond  immediately  to short-run 
changes  in output.  Since  some analysts  have found a long lag in response 
in certain  cases,  it appeared  useful  to test  the  proposition  by adding  a lagged 
term  for capacity  utilization.  In all cases  the unlagged  term  dominated  the 
lagged  term.  In most cases the unlagged  term  was insignificant.  For three 
industries-agriculture,  mining,  and communication-the  lagged  term  was 
marginally  significant.  For agriculture  and communication  the sum of the 
cyclical  coefficients  was well above the estimate  shown  in Table 2, while 
the others  generally  showed  a small  rise, ranging  from -0.01  for govern- 
ment to +0.14 for trade.  Given the marginal  contribution  of the lagged 
term,  all equations  were  run  without  it. 
18. In a recent article, Martin L. Marimont  gives a breakdown  of the methods of 
estimating  gross product  originating  in the service  industries,  showing  that 31 percent  is 
deflated  by output price, 36 percent  by the earnings  index, and the balance  by a mixture 
of the two. See his "Measuring  Real Output for Industries  Providing Services: OBE 
Concepts and Methods," in Victor R. Fuchs (ed.), Production  and Productivity  in the 
Service  Industries,  Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 34 (Columbia  University  Press 
for the National Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1969),  Tables 1 and 4. One of the more 
amusing  details brought  out by Marimont  is the index for current-dollar  output in the 
burial  industry:  This is the "number  of corpses  other  than paupers  needing  burial  times 
the average  current  price of cemetery  lots" (p. 33). The output concept is then corpses. 
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Table 6.  Evidence on Break in Productivity  Trend after 1965 
Differential  productivity  growth  after 1965 
Standard 
Industry  Coefficient  error  t-statistic 
Agriculture  0.00012  0.00092  0.1 
Mining  0.00710  0.00200  3.6 
Construction  0.02000  0.00420  4.8 
Nondurable  manufacturing  -0.00110  0.00100  -1.1 
Durable  manufacturing  0.00025  0.00180  0.1 
Transportation  -0.00550  0.00250  -2.2 
Communication  0.00380  0.00250  1.5 
Public utilities  0.00760  0.00170  4.6 
Trade  -0.00020  0.00110  -0.2 
FIRE  0.00380  0.00220  1.7 
Services  -0.00450  0.00083  -5.4 
Government  -0.00032  0.00058  -0.6 
Average  (weighted  by 1958 
normal  output)  0.00124  0.00158  ... 
Sources: Derived from  the  following  equation: e-  xni  =  60i +  61(x1 -  xni)  +  62it  +  63it  dum 66, 
where dum 66 =  0 up to 1965, and 1 after 1965, and the symbols are as identified in note 8. See Appendix 
B for sources of the basic data. 
A BREAK IN PRODUCTIVITY  TREND? 
The aggregate  results  presented  above indicate  that the residuals  gen- 
erally  reached  a minimum  around  1965.  Further,  the residuals  of the indi- 
vidual equations  form a similar  pattern  in several  cases.'9 It therefore 
seemed  worthwhile  to investigate  the possibility  of a slowdown  directly  by 
introducing  into the basic  equation  another  term,  which  allowed  for a dif- 
ferent  rate of productivity  growth  after 1965. 
Table  6 shows  the coefficients  on the additional  variable.  The weighted 
average  is very close to zero, indicating  that a weighted  average  of indi- 
vidual  productivity  growth  did not decline  significantly.20 
19. There are two ways of dating the turn in 1965. For the aggregate,  the residuals 
peak in 1965-66, then decline (see Table 9). Of the twelve industries  reported individ- 
ually in Table 5, nine show some kind of inflection  in the sixties-one  in 1963 and two 
each in the years 1964-67. The natural  breaking  point comes in 1965. 
20. The same kind of question  was investigated  using a quadratic  time term over the 
entire  period.  Judging  from the standard  errors,  this was sometimes  a superior  specifica- 
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DEMOGRAPHIC  COMPOSITION OF THE LABOR FORCE 
The dramatic change in the composition  of the labor force in  recent 
years has appeared to some analysts to be the root of the recent produc- 
tivity slowdown. The reasoning behind this view was stated by Perry: 
In the weighted  employment  total, an employee  whose productivity  (as mea- 
sured  by his wage) is only half the average  productivity  of all workers  gets only 
half weight. 
Since  the composition  of the work force  has been shifting  continually  toward 
relatively  more women and young workers,  individuals  who have relatively  low 
wage weights, the growth rate of weighted  employment  is lower than that of 
officially  measured  employment  throughout  the postwar  period. But while the 
difference  between  the growth  rate of the two measures  averaged  about 0.2 per- 
centage point until 1965, it became 0.5 percentage  point during the 1965-70 
period.  This change makes it especially  important  to use the weighted  employ- 
ment variable in analyzing  the trend of productivity  and potential output in 
recent  years.2' 
The assumption that relative average productivities of various groups of 
workers are proportional to  relative earnings is a hallowed tradition in 
productivity studies. It rests on the proposition that in a competitive equi- 
librium relative values of marginal products of inputs are proportional to 
the relative prices of the inputs. 
In the context of relative average productivities, arguments can be made 
on both sides of this proposition. Supporting it is the traditional body of 
economic theory. But two factors cast serious doubt on it. First, if, as many 
economists have argued, discrimination has acted in favor of prime-age 
males (in the sense that relative wages are not proportional to relative mar- 
ginal physical productivities), movement of females into traditionally male 
industries will not lead to the deterioration in productivity predicted by the 
demographic composition hypothesis. 
Second, and perhaps more important, a large part of the increase in em- 
ployment of females has taken place in  industries where output  is  not 
measured with any precision. Thus about three-fourths of female workers 
are employed in  services, trade, FIRE,  and  government-all  of  which 
suffer from serious conceptual problems in the measurement of output. 
The test proposed here does not develop a complete measure of "wage- 
weighted employment" because of data limitations. There are, however, 
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data  for the  proportion  of total  employees  who are  female  for all industries, 
for periods  beginning  variously  from 1948  to 1964.22 
The following  technique  was used to test the demographic  composition 
hypothesis.  The hypothesis  holds that wage-weighted  manhours,  e4,  is the 
correct  variable  for the basic  productivity  equation,  (7) above: 
(7D)  e-  xni  =  Oi +  li(x, -  xni) +  62it  +  U4, 
where  u* is the error  term. 
Assuming  that  (7D) is the correct  model,  it can be rewritten  as: 
ie*  -es  +  ei -xni  =  60i  +  bl(Xi-Xni)  +  62it  +  u, 
or 
e-  xni  =  boi+  1li(xi  -  xni)  +  62it  +  (et  -  e*) +  u!. 
The easiest  way to test this is to include  (ei -  e*) as an additional  inde- 
penderit  variable: 
(9)  es-xni  =  aO  +  31i(xi 
-  xni)  +  62it  +  63i(ei-e*)  +  ue  . 
If the coefficient  on (e, -  e)  turns  out to be zero,  the demographic  compo- 
sition  hypothesis  is rejected,  while  if it is unity  the hypothesis  is supported. 
The results  for the test of the demographic  composition  hypothesis  are 
shown  in Table  7. In general,  the addition  of the demographic  term  does 
not significantly  improve  the explanation.  In no industry  are  the data  able 
to distinguish  between  the unitary  coefficient  (signifying  that demographic 
composition  matters)  and a coefficient  of zero (composition  does not 
matter).23  In a few industries  the demographic  term  is significant,  but only 
22. Perry's  procedure  was more complicated than the one used here, since he cor- 
rected for age as well as sex composition (ibid., p. 564). The data indicate  that for the 
1960s most of the power is obtained by the change in sex composition.  The following 
are the average  annual  changes in the ratios of teenagers  and females  to total employ- 
ment over recent periods: 
1955-65  1965-71 
Teenagers  to total  0.0010  0.0014 
Females  to total  0.0033  0.0049 
23. It is difficult  to construct  an aggregate  test of the hypothesis.  One approach  is to 
compare  the results  through  a likelihood-ratio  test, by comparing  the two hypotheses: 
the first, H1, that 633 iS zero and that demographic  composition has no effect, and the 
second, H2, that 83i iS one. The likelihood  ratio for industry  i, Xi,  gives the ratio of the 
likelihood function valued for H1 to the likelihood function valued for H2 under the 
standard  normality  assumptions.  The product  of the likelihood  ratios (X =  XI X X2 . . . 
X12) gives  the likelihood  ratio for the entire  sample,  1.07.  Although  no completely  appro- 
priate  test exists, the critical  ratios for a standard  two-tailed  5 percent  region for 92 de- 
grees of freedom are 0.37 and 2.7. From the data analyzed above it is impossible to 
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Table 7.  Results for Test of Demographic  Composition  of the Labor 
Force as Reason for Slowdown  in Productivity, Selected Sample Periods, 
1948-71 
Coefficient  Sample  Degrees 
Industry  33  period  offreedom 
Agriculture  -0.149  1948-71  20 
(0.708) 
Mining  -2.46  1960-71  8 
(12.33) 
Construction  -7.76  1964-71  4 
(40.35) 
Nondurable  manufacturing  1.70  1959-71  9 
(5.56) 
Durable manufacturing  8.02  1959-71  9 
(1.27) 
Transportation  -6.48  1964-71  4 
(2.46) 
Communication  22.04  1964-71  4 
(14.76) 
Public utilities  8.98  1964-71  4 
(10.92) 
Trade  8.81  1960-71  8 
(2.56) 
FIRE  10.10  1960-71  8 
(2.04) 
Services  0.180  1958-71  10 
(1.03) 
Government  6.35  1964-71  4 
(1.43) 
Sources:  Equation  (9)  discussed  in the  text.  See  Appendix  B for  sources  of  the basic  data.  The  numbers  in 
parentheses  are  standard  errors. 
at the cost of lying  well  outside  of the a priori  range  of zero  to one. In trans- 
portation,  for example,  the coefficient  is significantly  negative,  while for 
government,  trade, FIRE, and durable  manufacturing,  it is significantly 
greater  than  unity.  Only  in agriculture  do the data  begin  to distinguish  be- 
tween  the two hypotheses;  here  the coefficient  is almost  significantly  differ- 
ent from  unity. 
One other  questionable  result  comes  out of the disaggregation.  Three  of 
the four  industries  in which  the demographic  effect  shows  up (trade,  FIRE, 
and government)  are those in which  the output  measures  are seriously  de- 
fective.  These  industries  account  for half of female  employment.  It is espe- 
cially  puzzling  that  measured  productivity  per  person-hour  has  slowed  down 
in government  when  output  is measured  in person-hours. William D. Nordhaus  513 
Thus in no individual  industry  can the demographic  composition  hy- 
pothesis  be distinguished  from  its competitor.  The demographic  correction 
term  [log  (E/E*)]  is significant  in some  industries-durable  manufacturing, 
transportation,  trade,  FIRE,  and  government.  But  in each  of these  cases  the 
coefficient  is implausibly  large,  indicating  some spurious  correlation. 
Because  the data used here cannot  distinguish  between  the hypotheses, 
neither  can be summarily  rejected.  However,  the demographic  variable 
does not move sufficiently  in the sample  periods  to be a significant  factor 
in any single  industry.  Perhaps  the favorable  results  for the aggregate  pro- 
ductivity  equations  discovered  by Perry arise from spurious  correlation 
rather  than  from  the different  productivities  of different  age-sex  groups  that 
he hypothesized. 
CHANGING  CYCLICAL  RESPONSE 
A further  rationale  for the recent  productivity  slowdown  is the respon- 
siveness  of employment  to cyclical  conditions.  According  to this argument, 
the recession  after 1969 was unusual  because  it came after such a long 
period  of prosperity;  businessmen  perhaps  expected  that it would  be very 
brief  and  therefore  hoarded  their  labor  more  than  they  had  in earlier  reces- 
sions.  Employment  thus  would  decline  less than  it had in earlier  recessions 
and  productivity  would  rise  less rapidly. 
A couple  of approaches  were  used  to test this view.  First  I took the sim- 
plistic tack of allowing  cyclical  conditions  to react differently  before  and 
after  1964.  There  was  no general  pattern  except  general  insignificance.  Next 
I constructed  a variable  that reflected  the recent  labor market  slackness; 
the specific  variable  was  the average  unemployment  rate  over  the last three 
years.  A test was run to see if the cyclical  coefficient  responded  positively 
to labor  market  slackness;  only in services  was there  any  indication  that it 
did. It does not appear  plausible  that changes  in cyclical  response  can ac- 
count for the recent  productivity  slowdown. 
CAPITAL INPUTS 
The estimates  of productivity  presented  here  apply  to the average  prod- 
uct of labor. Other inputs, particularly  capital, are also important  in 
productivity  movements.  As shown  in the development  of the model  above, 
capital  inputs  enter  through  the coefficient  on time. Average  productivity 514  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
growth  in equation  (7) is 5li  =  f3i  +  0482i,  that is, the rate  of total factor 
productivity  growth  plus the product  of the growth  rate of capital-labor 
ratios  and  the elasticity  of normal  output  with  respect  to capital  inputs.  In- 
adequate  data on capital generally  prevent separating  the influence  of 
capital  and labor services,  and all productivity  estimates  are hampered  by 
this possible  specification  error.  A more complete  framework  for produc- 
tivity  accounting  might  well change  some of the conclusions  of this paper. 
Little  can  be done  to correct  this  shortcoming,  given  the  lack  of adequate 
data on capital  services.  I have,  however,  attempted  to see whether  the in- 
troduction  of capital  into the production  relations  would  alter  the results. 
The  experiments  were  confined  to three  sectors,  agriculture,  manufacturing, 
and  private  nonfarm  nonmanufacturing,  for which  the U.S. Office  of Busi- 
ness Economics  made  a careful  study of capital  stocks (see Appendix  B). 
Introducing  capital  involves  the basic production  relations  in equation 
(4a). Since  the short-run  productivity  term  and the effect  of capital  cannot 
be simultaneously  estimated,  the assumption  is that the short-run  produc- 
tivity  coefficient  in equation  (7) is unity  (that  is, 5li =  1). 
From (4a) and (6), 
xn,=  Oi +  ill(e,  -  xi +  xn, -v3)  +  32jki +  #3it +  v2i 
or 
(1- 61)  _o  - 2  0i  0  (7K)  e, =(  lxni-?  +  X-a  k  -:  t -  ' 
+  V3i. 
131i  131i  131i 
I' 
31i  11i 
Again assuming  constant  returns,  the final  equation  is 
(7KC)  ei-  xi  =  1pAi(xn  -k)  -33  +  (V3-  ) 
Table 8 gives  the estimates  of equations  (7K) and (7KC). 
The results  for capital  are  very  discouraging.  In all equations  the capital 
term  has the wrong  sign, although  it is significant  only for manufacturing. 
There  is obviously  good reason  for the wrong  sign.  Some  capital  deepening 
occurred  in the late 1960s  as a result  of the investment  boom, yet produc- 
tivity  per  manhour  turned  down,  if anything.  Plainly,  recent  movements  in 
labor productivity  are not explicable  in terms  of the omission  of capital. 
The implications  of these  results  for use of empirical  aggregate  production 
functions  are mrntters  for fiirthler reflection  24 
24. The possibility that the omission of capital, land, and other inputs could be 
biasing  the results  can be independently  checked  from Denison's estimates.  In his com- 
ments on Perry  cited in note 5, Denison implicitly  estimates  the annual growth of total 
input per manhour  (see his Table 1, line 3 plus line 7 minus  line 4, Brookings  Papers  o William  D. Nordhaus  515 
Table 8.  Results for Test of Capital Equations  as Explanation of 
Slowdown  in Productivity 
Coefficients  Standard  Durbin- 
error  of  Watson 
Industry  'Yo  'Y  Y2  y3  estimate  statistic 
Equation  (7KC) 
Farm  9.46  -0.0474  -0.0537  ...  0.0175  2.31 
(0.065)  (0.00064) 
Manufacturing  8.61  -0.206  -0.0250  ...  0.0179  0.92 
(0.100)  (0.0013) 
Other private  8.568  -0.142  -0.0240  ...  0.0127  1.17 
(0.118)  (0.00048) 
Equation  (7K) 
Farm  10.97  -0.568  -0.0476  0.0791  0.0177  2.27 
(0.749)  (0.00876)  (0.0802) 
Manufacturing  11.18  -0.707  -0.00512  0.186  0.0166  1.17 
(0.257)  (0.00956)  (0.0929) 
Other private  11.10  -0.495  -0.00589  0.0372  0.0117  1.29 
(0.200)  (0.0086)  (0.120) 
Sources: Derived from equation (7KC7 and equation (7K), discussed in the text. See Appendix B for 
sources of the basic data. The numbers in parentheses  are standard errors. 
The Recent  Slowdown 
The result  of all the tests of the competing  hypotheses  about  the recent 
productivity slowdown is that the basic disaggregated  model-the  sectoral 
model of productivity  introduced  in equations  (2) to (8)-cannot  be sig- 
nificantly  improved  upon by any of these devices;  hence that model will 
serve  as the sole basis  for subsequent  discussion. 
PRODUCTIVIIY  PERFORMANCE  IN THE DISAGGREGATED  MODEL 
The first  and most important  test will be to determine  the predicted  em- 
ployment  requirements  in the basic disaggregated  model to see whether 
these  indicate  a significant  slowdown  in the aggregate  growth  of labor  pro- 
ductivity.  This test employs  a simulation  of the employment  requirements 
generated  by the estimates  from equations  (2) to (8). For this simulation, 
Economic  Activity,  3:1971, p. 569). This  figure  is 1.28 percent  for 1948-55, 0.81 percent 
for 1955-65, and 0.94 percent  for 1965-69.  Denison's  corrections  (not all of which  are,  in 
my mind, acceptable)  would predict  a slowdown  of about 0.34 percent  in the growth  of 
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normal  aggregate  output,  sectoral  outputs,  and sectoral  prices  are  taken  as 
exogenous.  The demand  equations  then generate  normal  outputs  for each 
industry  from  equation  (3), while  the manhour  requirements  are  generated 
by the manhour  demand  equations  (7). The aggregate  manhour  require- 
ments  are  then  the sum of the individual  predictions. 
The results  of this simulation  are shown  in Table  9 alongside  the anal- 
Table  9. Predictions  of Manhour  Requirements  and  Errors  in  the  Predictions, 
Aggregate  and  Disaggregated  Models,  1948-71 
Percentage  error  in 
productivity  indexb 
Manhoursa 
Year  (billions)  Aggregate  Disaggregated 
1948  2.551  2.870  0.811 
1949  2.465  0.378  -0.392 
1950  2.551  0.504  -1.924 
1951  2.709  0.799  0.037 
1952  2.749  0.489  1.249 
1953  2.771  -0.617  0.702 
1954  2.689  -1.150  0.051 
1955  2.736  -1.590  -1.457 
1956  2.772  -0.387  0.258 
1957  2.745  -0.450  0.574 
1958  2.653  -1.418  -0.201 
1959  2.738  0.787  0.074 
1960  2.761  0.551  0.942 
1961  2.748  0.244  0.588 
1962  2.822  0.654  0.385 
1963  2.834  -0.597  -0.111 
1964  2.911  -0.990  -0.836 
1965  3.007  -1.283  -0.893 
1966  3.124  -1.288  -0.491 
1967  3.149  -1.070  -0.178 
1968  3.213  -0.809  -0.745 
1969  3.288  1.193  0.451 
1970  3.246  2.107  1.009 
1971  3.225  1.916  -0.167 
Root mean-square 
error  ...  1.207  0.783 
Sources: The aggregate model is the aggregate equation (1). The disaggregated model is estimated in 
equations (7) above, using the actual output and estimated normal output for each industry, as well as 
historical unemployment, price, and aggregate normal output (see Appendix B). The manhour prediction 
for the disaggregated  model then simply adds up the predicted  manhour requirements  for each industry to 
arrive at the total. 
a.  Actual number of manhours (weekly rate). 
b.  Percentage  error in the predictions Qf  the aggregate  mnodel  and the disaggregated  model [100 (actual - 
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Table  10. Sources  of Growth  in Labor  Productivity,  Subperiods  1948-71 
Percentage  points 
Changes, 
1948-55 to 
Source  1948-55  1955-65  1965-71  1965-71 
Aggregate  productivity  growth 
Cyclically  corrected  3.20  2.54  2.03  -1.17 
Constant  industrial  productivity 
growth,  cyclically  corrected  3.13  2.53  2.23  -0.90 
Source of effect on aggregate 
productivity  growth 
Changing  industrial  productivity 
growth  0.07  0.01  -0.20  -0.27 
Changing  composition  of output 
relative  to 1955-65  0.60  0.00  -0.30  -0.90 
Source: Table 9. 
ogous predictions  from  the aggregate  productivity  equation  (1). Disaggre- 
gation  has  clearly  yielded  a significant  gain,  reducing  the  root  mean  error  by 
35 percent  and  lowering  the standard  error  to 0.8 percent,  which  is quite  re- 
spectable  in comparison  with  other  studies. 
Of greater  interest  is the fate  of the recent  slowdown.  The second  column 
of Table  9 shows  the performance  of the aggregate  productivity  equation  in 
explaining  the recent  productivity  slowdown.  It shows an inflection  point 
after  1965,  as an underestimate  of productivity  of 1.3  percent  turns  into an 
overestimate  of 2 percent  by 1970-71.  The  performance  of the  disaggregated 
equations,  which  reflect  the effects  of compositional  shift,  is recorded  in the 
third  column;  it reveals  virtually  no unexplained  slowdown  after  1965,  with 
the errors  of 1965  and 1971  differing  by only 0.7 percent. 
These  calculations  support  a preliminary  judgment  about  the sources  of 
the recent  deceleration  in labor  productivity.  Table  10 shows  the contribu- 
tion of changing  composition  of output  and  of unexplained  rates  of produc- 
tivity  growth  in individual  industries.  The  actual  growth  of productivity  per 
manhour  (cyclically  corrected)  slowed by 1.17 percentage  points from 
1948-55  to 1965-71.  Of these 1.17  points, 0.90 is predicted  simply  by the 
changing  composition  of output  and 0.27 is due to unexplained  productiv- 
ity deceleration  in individual  industries.25 
25. Productivity  also caused concern in 1956-57. Unlike the recent experience,  that 
slowdown  was greater  for the disaggregated  model than for the aggregate  equation  (see 
Table 9). The 1956-57 slowdown shows up very broadly across almost all industries, 
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Table 11. Predicted and Actual Output Shares, by Industry,  Subperiods 
1948-80 
Percent 
1948-55  1956-65  1966-71  1972-80 
Pre-  Pre-  Pre-  Pre- 
Industry  dicted Actual  dicted Actual  dicted Actual  dicted 
Agriculture  5.5  5.5  4.5  4.6  3.6  3.6  3.1 
Mining  3.1  3.0  2.6  2.7  2.4  2.3  2.1 
Construction  4.8  4.6  4.1  4.4  3.6  3.4  3.1 
Nondurable  manufac- 
turing  12.4  12.3  12.1  12.3  12.6  12.5  12.4 
Durable manufacturing  17.8  17.6  16.9  17.2  18.7  18.2  18.2 
Transportation  5.5  5.5  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.3 
Communication  1.6  1.6  2.1  2.1  2.8  2.8  3.6 
Public utilities  1.9  1.8  2.4  2.5  2.9  2.8  3.4 
Trade  16.5  16.4  16.7  16.9  17.2  17.3  17.5 
FIRE  10.6  11.6  14.8  13.2  12.4  13.3  13.9 
Services  9.3  9.1  9.2  9.5  9.4  9.4  9.5 
Government  11.0  11.0  10.0  10.1  9.7  9.6  8.8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources: Actual figures are raw shares of each industry without cyclical correction (see Appendix B). 
The predictions are made according to the simulation procedure described in the text (pp. 515-16), and 
exclude cyclical movements. Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 
MOVEMENTS IN OUTPUT  AND  EMPLOYMENT SHARES 
The actual and estimated  movements  in output shares  in each of the 
twelve  sectors  are  shown  in Table  I  1. For the historical  period  1948-7  1, the 
shares  predicted  from  the demand  equations  when output  is at its normal 
level (with prices and outputs endogenous)  are shown as "predicted," 
while the historical  shares  are shown as "actual."  The only appreciable 
error  is for FIRE, the troublesome  residual  industry.  The last column  of 
Table  11  shows  the  projected  shares  for the 1972-80  period,  which  imply  no 
dramatic  or discontinuous  shifts. The only faintly  noticeable  movements 
are that real government  output  is projected  to fall slightly  faster  than its 
most recent  rate and that the manufacturing  share  is predicted  to reverse 
the increase  observed  from  the second  to the third  subperiod.26 
26. The possibility  that using fixed (1958)  weights  biases  the estimate  of productivity 
growth should be considered. It is a well-known phenomenon in economic growth 
that-because  of the negative  correlation  of output growth and price changes-using 
early prices overstates  growth and productivity,  and conversely.  The presence  of this 
effect can be checked only in a limited way because it is possible to disaggregate  only William  D.  Nordhaus  519 
Table  12. Manhour  Shares,  by Industry,  Actual  for Selected  Years, 
1948-71,  Predicted,  1980 
Percent 
Industry  1948  1955  1965  1971  1980 
Agriculture  17.9  12.4  7.5  5.3  3.2 
Mining  1.5  1.3  0.9  0.8  0.6 
Construction  4.1  5.2  4.9  4.6  4.6 
Nondurable  manufacturing  11.4  10.8  10.3  10.2  9.0 
Durable  manufacturing  12.8  14.8  15.1  14.5  14.5 
Transportation  5.6  4.4  3.8  3.6  2.9 
Communication  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3 
Public utilities  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8 
Trade  18.6  18.6  18.9  18.8  18.2 
FIRE  2.8  3.6  4.3  4.3  4.6 
Services  12.4  12.6  15.8  16.5  19.1 
Government  10.9  14.0  16.4  19.1  21.2 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources: Figures for 1948, 1955, 1965, and 1971 are actual shares of each industry in total manhours, 
cyclically corrected (see Appendix B). Figures for 1980 are those predicted by the simulations described in 
the text. Figures may not add to totals due to rounding. 
The movement  of the relative  shares  in total  manhours  is shown  in Table 
12. Comparison  of the two tables  underlines  the differential  movement  of 
output  shares  and manhour  shares  as a result  of differing  rates  of produc- 
tivity  growth  among  industries. 
FURTHER  DISSECTION  OF THE CHANGING  RATE OF 
PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH 
The  results  presented  so far  indicate  that  shifts  in the composition  of out- 
put have  accounted  for a sizable  part  of the recent  slowdown  in labor  pro- 
ductivity.  But why  and how? 
Consider  how changes  in composition  among  industries  affect  the aggre- 
gate growth  of productivity.  Even if every  industry  has its own constant 
rate of trend  productivity  growth,  as assumed  in the model above,  the ag- 
gregate  growth of productivity  is not merely an average  with constant 
weights of the sectoral  productivity  growth  rates. First, any systematic 
twelve broad industry  groups. With 1969 rather  than 1958 prices, the growth of labor 
productivity  in the period 1948-58 was 0.12 percent  less than that reported  above. The 
corresponding  effect appeared  for the 1958-70 period, but the magnitude  was only 0.025 
percent.  It does not appear  likely that problems  of index numbers  lie behind  the slow- 
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tendency  for industries  with  especially  high  rates  of productivity  growth  to 
have  rising  shares  of output  over time increases  their  weights  and adds  to 
aggregate  productivity  growth.  Second,  a systematic  shift of employment 
shares  from  industries  with low productivity  levels  to ones with high pro- 
ductivity  levels raises the growth of  aggregate  productivity  above the 
weighted  average  of the sectors.  Conversely,  movements  of output  shares 
toward  sectors  with  low productivity  growth  rates  or of employment  shares 
toward  sectors  of low productivity  levels  will depress  the aggregate  growth 
of productivity. 
As equation  (A-2)  in Appendix  A demonstrates,  the growth  of aggregate 
productivity  can  be decomposed  into several  parts  to reflect  these  composi- 
tional  impacts.  The  first  term  (a predicted  fixed-weight  rate  term)  shows  the 
predicted  rate  of aggregate  productivity  growth  if relative  shares  of output 
were  constant  and if levels of productivity  were  identical  in all industries. 
The second  term  (change  in the predicted  fixed-weight  rate  term)  shows 
the impact  of changes  in the shares  of output  among  sectors,  still ignoring 
differences  in levels  of productivity  among  them. 
The third and fourth terms  show the effects  of changing  employment 
shares  among  industries  with  different  levels  of productivity.  They  measure 
the extent  to which  employment  has tended  to shift toward  or away  from 
industries  with  above-average  productivity  levels.  This  effect  is broken  into 
two terms:  the fixed-productivity-weight  term  ("fixed-weight  level term"), 
measuring  the pure  level effect  if relative  productivity  levels  among  indus- 
tries had remained  constant  at their 1958  values; and the "actual-weight 
level term,"  showing  the effect  of the interaction  of changing  employment 
shares  and changing  relative  productivity  levels. 
Table 13 decomposes  the growth  of productivity  into the four  terms  dis- 
cussed  above  for the three  subperiods  of the postwar  period.27  The sum of 
the four terms  gives the predicted  rate of aggregate  productivity  change. 
This dissection  of productivity  change  indicates  that the slowdown  in pro- 
ductivity  growth  can be traced  almost  exclusively  to the level  factor,  or the 
effect  on aggregate  productivity  of shifts  in employment  shares  among  in- 
dustries  with  different  levels  of productivity.  In the early  postwar  period  of 
1948-55,  the level  terms  added  0.75 percentage  point to aggregate  produc- 
27. Both the first and second terms above used the predicted  rather  than the actual 
rate of productivity  growth in the various industries;  as shown in Appendix A, this 
introduces  a fifth term of "unexplained  change,"  which is fortunately  small and hence 
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Table  13. Decomposition  of Predicted  Rate of Labor  Productivity  Growth, 
and  Actual  Rate of Growth,  Cyclically  Corrected,  Subperiods  1948-71. 
Component  or aggregate  1948-55  1955-65  1965-71 
Predicted  rate terms 
1. Fixed-weight  (1958 weights)  2.34  2.34  2.34 
2. Change  in fixed-weight  term  0.01  0.02  0.05 
Level terms 
3. Fixed-weight  (1958 weights)  0.55  0.19  -0.04 
4. Actual-weight  0.20  -0.03  -0.14 
5.  Predicted  rate of aggregate  productivity 
growth,  cyclically  corrected  3.10  2.52  2.21 
6. Actual rate of aggregate  productivity  growth, 
cyclically  corrected  from equation  (1)  3.20  2.54  2.03 
Sources: Derived from equation (A-2) discussed in Appendix A, and basic data cited in Appendix B. The 
derivation of the components is as follows: 
Lines 1 and 2-The  predicted rate is given by summing -32AZW(t) for the twelve industries where Zi(t) is 
the output share of the industry and the -62i  are the productivity growth rates from Table 2. Line 1 uses 
the values of the Z, for 1958, while line 2 is the value for a given year minus the value for 1958. 
Lines 3 and 4-The  level terms are 2-  [(AiAO)?-1]  for line 3 and 2X&j(t)[(AJ/AO)  -  (Ai/AO)O]  for line 4, 
where Si  =  share of predicted manhours of industry i, Ai  = productivity per manhour in industry i, and 
the superscript  zeros evaluate the ratios for the base year, 1958. See Appendix A. 
Line 5-Sum  of lines 1 to 4. 
Line 6-Actual  rate of change in aggregate productivity corrected for the cycle using the cyclical correction 
estimated in equation (1). 
tivity  growth,  signifying  a marked  shift  of employment  toward  industries  of 
especially  high productivity;  in the most recent  period, 1965-71,  the level 
effects dragged  down aggregate  productivity  growth  by 0.18 percentage 
point. Comparing  the two periods,  the change  in the level terms  accounts 
for almost  1 full  percentage  point  slowdown  in the growth  of aggregate  pro- 
ductivity.  Roughly  two-thirds  of that swing  is accounted  for by the fixed- 
weight  level  term,  reflecting  the differences  in productivity  levels. 
It is striking  that the rate effect  seems  to be negligible,  recording  a very 
small shift in the shares  of output toward  industries  with high rates of 
productivity  growth. 
In combination  the separate  effects  yield the predictions  of aggregate 
productivity  growth  shown  in line 5 of the table,  which  correspond  reason- 
ably  closely  to the cyclically  corrected  estimate  of the actual  rate  of produc- 
tivity shown  in line 6. The prediction  shown  in line 5 reflects  a slowdown 
of aggregate  labor  productivity  growth  of almost  a full percentage  point  in 
the postwar  period,  only slightly  less than  the actual  slowdown.28 
28. The discrepancy  of 0.01 to 0.03 percentage  point between  the predicted  rates of 
aggregate  productivity  growth  on line 2 of Table 10 and on line 5 of Table 13 probably 
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CONTRIBUTION  OF INDIVIDUAL  INDUSTRIES  TO THE LEVEL EFFECT 
It is possible  to focus the analysis  further  by examining  the contribution 
of each  individual  industry  to the  level  terms,  which  were  found  above  to be 
the  main  elements  in the  productivity  slowdown.  Each  of the  level  terms  can 
be decomposed  into the twelve  components-each  representing  the effect  of 
the change  in the employment  share  of a specific  industry  on aggregate  pro- 
ductivity.  Thus  the fixed-weight  level  term  for agriculture  reflects  the effect 
of the falling  employment  share  of agriculture,  taking  the productivity  of 
agriculture  relative  to the aggregate  at the level of 1958.  The actual-weight 
level  term  for agriculture  then represents  the difference  in the effect  of em- 
ployment  shifts  which  in turn  reflects  the fact  that  agriculture's  relative  pro- 
ductivity  actually  differed  from  the 1958  value. 
Productivity  relatives  among industries,  recorded  in Table 14, reveal 
considerable  dispersion,  with  productivity  in agriculture,  services,  and gov- 
ernment  falling  decidedly  below  the mean,  while  that  in mining,  communi- 
cation,  public  utilities,  and  FIRE considerably  exceeds  it. Given  the sizable 
differences  in productivity,  it is not implausible  for the level effects  to be 
quite  large. 
Table  15 indicates  how the twelve  industries  contribute  to the total level 
effect;  it thus decomposes  lines  3 and 4 of Table  13. 
Table 14.  Productivity  Relatives, by Industry,  Selected Years, 1948-80a 
Industry  1948  1955  1965  1971  1980b 
Agriculture  0.35  0.41  0.55  0.66  0.88 
Mining  2.19  2.29  2.58  2.83  3.27 
Construction  1.06  0.91  0.77  0.73  0.64 
Nondurable  manufacturing  1.12  1.12  1.19  1.25  1.38 
Durable manufacturing  1.27  1.22  1.21  1.23  1.27 
Transportation  1.12  1.14  1.23  1.30  1.46 
Communication  1.16  1.38  1.88  2.25  3.17 
Public utilities  1.89  2.23  2.99  3.53  4.89 
Trade  0.91  0.88  0.90  0.93  0.98 
FIRE  3.81  3.45  3.16  3.06  2.94 
Services  0.81  0.70  0.59  0.56  0.50 
Government  0.94  0.75  0.57  0.51  0.40 
Aggregate  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Source: Derived from manhour and gross product data described in Appendix B. 
a.  The table shows manhour productivity (cyclically corrected) in a given industry relative to the aggre- 
gate productivity per manhour. 
b.  Predicted from the simulation described in the text. William  D. Nordhaus  523 
The industries  making the most important  contribution  to the level 
effect  are agriculture,  durable  manufacturing,  FIRE, services,  and govern- 
ment. For all of the postwar  period,  the shift out of agriculture  (with its 
below-average  level of productivity)  has provided  a considerable  boost to 
the growth  of aggregate  productivity,  contributing  on average  about one- 
Table 15.  Contribution  of Level Effects to the Decline in Labor 
Productivity,  by Industry,  Subperiods  1948-71a 
Percentage  points 
Changes, 
1948-55 to 
Type  of effect and industry  1948-55  1955-65  1965-71  1965-71 
Fixed-weight  effect 
Total, all industries  0.55  0.19  -0.04  -0.59 
Agriculture  0.44  0.27  0.20  -0.24 
Mining  -0.04  -0.05  -0.03  -0.01 
Construction  -0.02  *  *  0.02 
Nondurable  manufacturing  -0.01  *  *  0.01 
Durable  manufacturing  0.06  *  -0.02  -0.08 
Transportation  -0.02  -0.01  *  0.02 
Communication  *  *  *  * 
Public utilities  0.02  *  -0.01  -0.03 
Trade  *  *  *  * 
FIRE  0.29  0.16  *  -0.29 
Services  -0.01  -0.11  -0.04  -0.03 
Government  -0.14  -0.07  -0.14  * 
Actual-weight  effect 
Total, all industries  0.20  -0.03  -0.14  -0.34 
Agriculture  0.06  -0.01  -0.05  -0.11 
Mining  *  *  *  * 
Construction  0.02  *  *  -0.02 
Nondurable  manufacturing  *  *  *  * 
Durable  manufacturing  *  *  *  * 
Transportation  *  *  *  * 
Communication  *  *  *  * 
Public utilities  *  *  *  * 
Trade  *  *  * 
FIRE  0.04  *  *  -0.04 
Services  *  *  *  * 
Government  0.08  *  -0.07  -0.15 
Sources:  The  fixed-weight effect for  industry i  is  defined from  equation  (A-2)  in  Appendix A  as 
SA[(Ai/Ao)O  -  1], while the actual-weight effect is &i[(Ai/A)O -  (Ai/Ao)]. S,  = change in the share of total 
manhours in industry  1,  and the superscript  zero refers  to the value for the base year (1958). See Appendix B 
for the sources of the basic data. The figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 
a.  The values shown are the contributions of individual industries to the total level effect. 
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quarter  percentage  point a year  to it. On the other  hand,  the employment 
shifts  toward  both services  and government  (also low-productivity  indus- 
tries)  have  been  a drag,  each  slowing  the productivity  growth  rate  by about 
0.1 percentage  point. 
What  industries  have  contributed  most  to the decline  in the level  effect  of 
0.93 percentage  point?  Clearly  agriculture  and FIRE are the most impor- 
tant,  contributing  -0.35 and -0.33, respectively.  Government  and  durable 
manufacturing  are  also important,  contributing  -0.15  and -0.08,  respec- 
tively.  The decline  in the contribution  of agriculture  reflects  the fact that 
employment  in agriculture  has fallen  from 18 percent  of manhours  in 1948 
to only 5 percent  currently,  so that a given  proportional  decline  in its em- 
ployment  now has a much smaller  effect  on aggregate  manhours.  More- 
over,  because  agriculture's  productivity  relative  is rising,  although  still far 
below  unity  (Table  14),  the actual-weight  effect  is positive  before  1958  and 
negative  thereafter.  In the case of government,  the share  of manhours  has 
been  rising  (Table  12)  while  the  productivity  relative  has  kept  falling  (Table 
14), resulting  in an adverse  shift in the actual-weight  effect.  For durable 
manufacturing  (an industry  of above-average  productivity  level), the em- 
ployment  share  rose early  in the postwar  period,  but has recently  dipped. 
Perhaps  the only puzzling  results  are those for services  and for FIRE. 
How is it possible  that services  were  so small  a drag  over  the entire  period 
and virtually  no drag  for 1965-71?  The reason  was the sudden  strengthen- 
ing in productivity  in the service  sector  after  1965  and the associated  slow- 
down  in its share  of manhours  (Tables  4 and 12). 
And how could FIRE have contributed  so much  in early  years  and so 
little  in recent  years?  The  problem  is mainly  one of measurement.  The  FIRE 
industry  consists  mainly  of real  estate,  including  owner-occupied  dwellings. 
It is extraordinarily  capital  intensive.  Labor's  share  of income  (employee 
compensation  as a percentage  of gross  product  originating)  was 22 percent 
for FIRE in 1969  as against  61 percent  for all industries.  Moreover,  of the 
total output  in FIRE, about  41 percent  is currently  imputation  on owner- 
occupied  dwellings,  for which there is no return  to labor.29  Obviously, 
movement  of output  in the FIRE industry,  in particular  its real  estate  por- 
tion, can have a significant  effect on output without  any corresponding 
effect on employment.  Thus the stability  of the manhour  share  of FIRE 
from 1965  to 1971  (see Table 12) led to a large  deceleration  in aggregate 
29. Thus while the entire economy showed an average productivity  per full-time 
equivalent  employee  of $14,700 in 1971, the figure  for real estate was $164,700! William  D. Nordhaus  525 
labor  productivity.  This result  implicates  the tight monetary  policy of the 
second  half of the sixties  in the productivity  slowdown,  but leaves  the ex- 
tent of its contribution  an intriguing  question.30 
THE GROWTH  OF POTENTIAL  OUTPUT  IN  THE 1970s 
What  growth  in potential  output  can the United  States  expect  during  the 
next decade?  As we have seen, the growth  in aggregate  labor  productivity 
has indeed  been  slowing,  but the analysis  here  points  to the changing  com- 
position of output as the cause. Because  the model can generate  future 
changes  in the composition  of output,  the growth  of potential  can be esti- 
mated  from  the combination  of the demand  relations  and the productivity 
and price  relations.  These  projections  differ  from others  only in projecting 
output  at normal  unemployment  (4.7 percent  of the civilian  labor force) 
rather  than at 4.0 percent.31 
The simulation  assumed  that the trend  productivity  estimates  for each 
industry  shown  in Table  2 would  hold for the period  1972-80.  An intuitive 
check of the plausibility  of this assumption  can be made by examining 
Table 4, which suggests  that the assumption  may be slightly  optimistic. 
30. In retrospect,  FIRE may have been a poor choice for a residual  industry,  given 
its contribution  to the productivity  slowdown.  As a test, FIRE was included  in the de- 
mand  equations  in the same  way as other  industries.  The simulation  of the disaggregated 
model in Table 9 was rerun  with this altered specification.  The result was to raise the 
residual  for the disaggregated  model by 0.00046 for 1948, by -0.00004  for 1965, by 
0.00054 in 1965, and by 0.00189 in 1971. The coefficients  of the productivity  equation 
for FIRE changed  very  little. There  do not appear  to be any serious  problems  stemming 
from the choice of FIRE as a residual  industry. 
31. An estimate of potential output using the "official"  unemployment  rate of 4.0 
percent  is relatively  easy  to make.  According  to the estimates  of labor  force  participation 
in Appendix A, the potential labor force participation  rate rises by 0.68 percentage 
point and the unemployment  rate falls by 0.7 percentage  point, so potential employ- 
ment rises by 0.68 +  0.75, or 1.43 percent.  If the normal  unemployment  rate falls from 
4.7 percent  to 4.0 percent,  no permanent  gain in productivity  would accrue, according 
to the model used here. Potential output would therefore  be 1.43 percent  higher  at 4.0 
percent unemployment  than at 4.7 percent. This is the assumption that is made in 
Table 17. If the normal unemployment  rate were to stay at 4.7 percent,  cyclical pro- 
ductivity  gains of about  0.5 percent  (or about $4 billion)  would be added  to the estimate 
in Table 17. The assumption  that the normal unemployment  rate falls to 4.0 percent 
accounts for most of the difference  between the level of my estimate of conventional 
potential output for 1972 ($818.7 billion) and the official estimate ($825.0 billion). 
There is, however,  no substantial  effect on the rate of growth of potential from using 
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Table 16.  Rates of Productivity  Growth  per Manhour, Cyclically Corrected, 
Subperiods  1948-80 
Percent 
Period  Predictedfrom  model  Actual 
1948-55  3.13  3.20 
1955-65  2.53  2.54 
1965-71  2.23  2.03 
1971-76  2.16  ... 
1976-80  2.07  ... 
Sources: The prediction is normal output per manhour predicted from the estimated equations according 
to the procedures described in the text. Actual figures are from Table 13. 
Judging  from  the simulation  of the basic  model  shown  in Table  9, however, 
the errors  flowing  from the assumption  of constant  productivity  growth 
seem  roughly  to cancel  out by 1971.  Projecting  these  industry  trends  to 1980 
yields  the predicted  productivity  relatives  shown  in Table 14. The output 
and manhour  shares predicted  by the demand,  price, and productivity 
equations  are  recorded  above  in Tables  11 and 12. 
Table  16  shows  the  predicted  rate  of growth  of productivity  per  manhour. 
The simulation  projects  a continuation  of the slowing  trend  in output  per 
manhour  that was observed  over  most of the postwar  period,  although  the 
rate of deceleration  is predicted  to decline  slightly.  The prediction  for the 
period  from 1971  to 1980  is an average  annual  rate of growth  of produc- 
tivity  per  manhour  of about  2.1 percent,  substantially  below  the average  of 
about 2.6 percent  for the period 1948-71  but only slightly  below the 2.2 
percent  rate of 1965-71.  The reason  for the further  decline  is simply  the 
continually  shrinking  significance  of the movement  of employment  out of 
agriculture,  and the shift  into services  and government  (see Table  12). 
The estimates  of potential  output, of its growth,  and of labor produc- 
tivity  are presented  in Table 17. The most dramatic  figure  appears  for the 
rate of growth  of potential.  The model used here  projects  a growth  of 3.4 
percent  annually  over the 1970s,  considerably  slower  than in the last few 
years.  This figure  contrasts  with Perry's  optimistic  estimate  of 4.3 percent 
and with the official  estimate  of the current  growth of potential of 4.3 
percent.32 
The major  difference  between  Perry's  projection  and the projection  in 
Table 17 lies in predicted  productivity  growth.  Differences  in predicted  in- 
put  growth  are  small.  Perry  estimated  that  potential  manhours  (unweighted) 
32. Perry,  "Labor  Force Structure,"  p. 560. The "official"  estimate  is given in Busi- 
ness Conditions  Digest, several  recent issues. William  D. Nordhaus  527 
Table  17. Projection  of Potential  Output,  1972-80 
Potential  output  (billions  of 1958 dollars) 
Description  of economy  1972  1976  1980 
At 4 percent  unemployment  818.7  939.9  1,073.5 
At 4.7 percent  unemployment  807.1  925.9  1,058.4 
Average  annual 
rate of growth  (percent) 
Source  of growth  of 
potential  output  1972-76  1976-80 
Total growth  in potential  output  3.49  3.40 
Source 
Employment  1.57  1.55 
Average  hours  -0.24  -0.22 
Aggregate  productivity  2.16  2.07 
Source: Derived by author on the basis of simulations described in the text. 
would grow at 1.44 percent  over the period 1970-80, while I project  a 
growth  rate of 1.33  percent  over 1971-80.  On the other  hand, Perry  esti- 
mated  a 2.86 percent  average  of productivity  growth  for 1970-80,  whereas 
the present  estimate  is 2.1 percent  for 1971-80.33 
What  causes  this large  discrepancy  in predictions?  It revolves  essentially 
around  whether  the last five- or six-year  period  is seen as the exception  or 
the norm.  Perry  argues  that  the recent  productivity  deceleration  was  due  in 
part  to changes  in the composition  of the labor  force,  and  that as the labor 
force stabilizes  the growth of productivity  will rise toward its postwar 
average.  The  findings  here  suggest  that  it is the composition  of output  that 
is behind  the slowdown:  As the movement  toward  low-productivity  sectors 
continues,  we should  expect  a further  productivity  deceleration.34 
33. Perry's  figures  reported  here differ from those in his Table 2, ibid., and the sec- 
tion "Projected  Potential  Output,"  pp. 559-60. The figures  shown in Perry's  article are 
1.33 percent  growth  for weighted  manhours  and 2.97 percent  for weighted  productivity. 
Perry  has kindly  provided  me with an estimate  of growth  of unweighted  manhours,  which 
is the figure shown in the text. The estimate of productivity  is 4.30 -  1.44 = 2.86. 
34. It is useful to get a rough idea of the statistical  confidence  one can place in the 
projections.  The variance  of the midsample  estimate  of potential  output is equal to the 
sum of the variances  of productivity  level, labor force participation,  and hours (plus 
covariance  terms that will be ignored).  The variance  of the 1980 prediction  is then the 
variance  of the midsample  estimate  times a factor  (around  1.5 in the actual  calculations) 
that accounts for the fact that the 1980  level is way out from the sample mean. 
The variances  of productivity  level (for a given  demand  pattern),  labor  force  participa- 
tion rate, and hours-all  taken as a percent  of the mean-are  0.6, 1.7, and 0.7 percent, 
respectively.  If uncertainty  about demand  adds another 1.0 percent  to the variance,  the 
total variance  of the 1980 prediction  is then 4.0 X 1.5 = 6.0 percent.  Thus the standard 528  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
In 1948-55,  the  economy  was  deriving  a considerable  bonus  in its  produc- 
tivity  growth  from  employment  shifts  among  industries  with different  pro- 
ductivity  levels.  If output  shares  remained  constant,  the long-run  growth  in 
labor  productivity  would  be 2.34 percent  (see Table  13),  but in this period, 
agriculture  and FIRE were contributing  approximately  an additional  0.8 
percentage  point  through  level  effects  (see  Table  15).  These  bonuses  did  not 
persist,  and by the 1965-71  period,  the level effects  were  actually  lowering 
the aggregate  growth  rate by almost 0.2 percent.  Unless dramatic  new 
trends  in the composition  of output  or in the underlying  growth  in labor 
productivity  develop  in the next decade,  a further  deterioration  in labor 
productivity  will develop  as the level effects  continue  to decline. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
A careful  examination  of the postwar  experience  reveals  a slowdown  in 
productivity  growth  in recent  years  over  and above  that  which  could  be ex- 
plained  by cyclical  conditions  alone. For the entire  economy,  the average 
annual  rate of productivity  growth  cyclically  corrected  fell from 3.20 per- 
cent in 1948-55  to 2.54 percent  in 1955-65, and then to 2.03 percent  in 
1965-71.  Disaggregating  to twelve  broad  industry  groups  serves  to explain 
most of the deceleration  simply  in terms  of change  in the composition  of 
demand  and unchanging  rates  of productivity  growth  in individual  indus- 
tries. More precisely,  the estimated  aggregated  productivity  growth  with 
unchanging  individual  industrial  productivity  growth  was  3.13  percent,  2.53 
percent,  and 2.23 percent,  respectively,  for the three  periods. 
A further  dissection  of the cause of the slowdown  indicates  that it was 
due mainly  to differences  in productivity  levels among industries,  rather 
than to different  rates  of growth  of productivity  among  industries.  In this 
regard,  the contributions  of agriculture  and FIRE were especially  impor- 
tant, while durable  manufacturing  and government  also retarded  growth. 
Projections  of future  patterns  of demand  indicate  that the productivity 
growth  rate  for the 1970s  should  proceed  at a rate  slightly  lower  than  pre- 
dicted  for the last few years.  Specifically,  if demand  follows  historical  pat- 
error  of prediction  of the 1972-80 growth  rate is on the order of 0.3 percentage  point. 
Note that this estimate  accounts  for the autocorrelation  in the residuals  of the estimated 
equation.  If the usual statistical  criteria  were applied,  the range  from 2.9 to 4.1 percent 
would be a 95 percent  confidence  interval  for the prediction  of the 1972-80 growth  rate. William  D. Nordhaus  529 
terns and if productivity  changes  in individual  industries  remain  at their 
postwar  averages,  the rate of productivity  growth  per manhour  should  be 
about  2.1 percent  annualiy,  as compared  with  2.6 percent  annualiy  for the 
entire  1948-71  period. 
APPENDIX A 
Supplementary  Equations 
The  Decomposition  of Aggregate  Productivity 
THE DECOMPOSITION  of aggregate  productivity  is discussed  on pages  519- 
21. To separate  the cases,  the basic  relations  can be employed  again.  If Ai 
is cyclically  corrected  output  per manhour  in industry  i and Ao is the ag- 
gregate,  then  (suppressing  time  subscripts), 
AO  =  XOIEO= (  i)(  )= EA=iSi 
where X =  gross national product, E =  manhours, and Si =  Ei/Eo is the 
ith industry's  share  of total manhours.  Taking  time  derivatives  (denoted  by 
dots above  variables), 
Ao  =  7Ajii  +  ZA.Si 
or 
A0  _  AA.A.  A. 
Ao =  'AI AAsi +  5`11_Si; 
Ao  Ai  o  o 
or, again  letting  lowercase  letters  indicate  logarithms, 
(A-  1)  =  i +  z  tS. 
0  0 
It is slightly  more  convenient  to transform  the first  part of equation  (A-1) 
into output terms. Let Zi =  XJ/XO  be the ith industry's  share of total 
output.  Equation  (A-1) can then be rewritten  as 
A. 
do =  EdiZ  +  A 
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Next, break  the second  term  (called  here the level term)  into three  parts: 
Level  term=  5A.  -X  -  +.A  1+1  X 
where  (Ai/AO)0  is the productivity  relative  in the base  year  (1958).  Because 
E  S~  is identically  zero, this can be rewritten: 
Level term =  I[A)  -1]  +  [()O  -A]  A 
Finally,  let ai be the estimated  value  for-  62i  shown  in Table  2 and  let Z? 
be the base year  (1958)  share  of Xi. The final  decomposition  of aggregate 
productivity  then  is 
predicted  fixed-  change in predicted 
weight rate term  fixed-weight  rate term 
(A-2)  &o  =  -"iZa  +  Eai[Zi(t)  -  Zi] 
+  [Si  )O  -  +  S[C)  -  0)O] 
fixed-weight  actual-weight 
level term  level term 
unexplained  change  in 
fixed-weight  rate term 
+  E(2@  -  a)[Z,(t) -  Zi]. 
The first  four  terms  constitute  the decomposition  shown  in Table 13. 
Projection  of Potential  Output 
The projection  of potential  output  relies  on the model outlined  in equa- 
tions (2) to (8). The only extraneous  estimates  needed  are  the estimates  for 
hours  by industry  and for total potential  employment. 
The following  equation  establishes  hours: 
hi =  aoi +  ali(xi  -  xni) +  a2it +  ei, 
where  hi = log hours,  xi =  log of gross  product  originating  by industry, 
and xni =  log of normal output in industry i. Since xi  =  xni for the simula- 
tion, hours  can be projected  independently  of output. 
For total employment  the procedure  is a bit more  complicated.  The  non- William  D. Nordhaus  531 
institutional  population  over 16 years  old is exogenous.  This  is taken  from 
projections  made  by the U.S. Bureau  of the Census  for 1980  and uses log- 
linear interpolation (data are from the Manpower Report of the President, 
1972, pp. 157, 252, and 253). 
The next step uses the following  participation  rate equation: 
PRt =  0.674 -  0.352  Ut -  0.413 Ut,  -  0.207 Ut-2  +  0.000228t, 
(0.122)  (0.132)  (0.113)  (0.00176) 
Standard  error  of the estimate  =  0.00514; Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.20; 
annual data, 1950-71. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
where  PR,  is the labor  force  participation  rate  (establishment  concept),  and 
U, is the unemployment  rate  (again,  establishment  concept). 
The normal  labor force  participation  rate, PR,.,,,  is the estimated  rate 
when  the unemployment  rate  is at the normal  rate.  Finally,  aggregate  nor- 
mal employment,  E.,,,  is then 
Eorm =  Pop 16 X PR,,,,  X (1 -  0.044). 
The actual  and predicted  labor force  participation  rates  (in percent)  are 
as follows: 
Actual  Predicted 
1950  62.0  62.4 
1960  62.5  62.3 
1970  64.6  64.1 
1980  ...  63.6 532  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
APPENDIX  B 
Data Sources 
Total employment  (ET): This series  is derived  from the U.S. Office  of 
Business  Economics  (OBE)  estimates  of total workers,  published  in the na- 
tional  income  accounts  tables  in July  issues  of the Survey of Current  Busi- 
ness (referred  to as NIA tables  below).  For each industry  except  agricul- 
ture,  total employment  equals  the total number  of part-time  and full-time 
employees  as well  as the self-employed.  No adjustment  is made  for  hours  of 
work.  Total  employment  for each  industry  is derived  as follows:  ET equals 
"persons  engaged  in production"  (NIA Table  6.6) plus "full  time and part 
time employees"  (NIA Table  6.3) minus  "full  time equivalent  employees" 
(NIA Table  6.4). 
The only modification  is that for agriculture  the labor force  survey  esti- 
mate  of unpaid  family  workers  is added  to the employment  estimate,  add- 
ing approximately  15  percent  to the estimate  for total agricultural  employ- 
ment.  For the nonfarm  sector,  the number  of unpaid  family  workers  was 
both small  (0.7 percent  of total nonagricultural  employment)  and almost 
constant;  therefore  nonfarm  unpaid  family  workers  were  omitted. 
There  are some serious  conceptual  differences  between  the OBE estab- 
lishment  series  and the U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS)  household 
concept  of employment  estimates.'  The OBE series  is the only acceptable 
one for  this  study  for  two reasons:  First,  some  care  is taken  to match  the em- 
ployment  data  with  the output  concept;  and,  second,  data  referring  to total 
number  of employees  and hours  (rather  than number  of workers  over 16 
years)  is appropriate  for productivity  estimates. 
Production  or nonsupervisory  workers.  The concept of production workers 
is of some importance  for the discussion  of productivity.  The BLS Hand- 
book of Methods  gives the following definitions  of production  or non- 
supervisory  workers: 
1. See the discussion  in Gloria P. Green, "Comparing  Employment  Estimates  from 
Household and Payroll Surveys," Monthly  Labor Review, Vol. 92 (December 1969), 
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In manufacturing  . . ., production  workers  [are]  those employees,  up through 
the level  of working  foremen,  who are engaged  directly  in the manufacture  of the 
product  of the establishment....  [This  excludes]  persons  in executive  and man- 
agerial  positions,  and persons  engaged  in activities  such  as accounting,  sales, ad- 
vertising,  routine office work, professional  and technical  functions,  and force 
account construction.  Production  workers  in mining are defined  in a similar 
manner.... 
In the transportation,  communication,  and public utility industries,  in retail 
and wholesale  trade, in finance,  insurance,  and real estate, and in most of the 
service industries .  .  . nonsupervisory workers include most  employees  except 
those in top executive  and managerial  positions. 
In contract  construction,  the term construction  workers  covers workers,  up 
through  the level of working  foremen,  who are engaged  directly  on the construc- 
tion project....2 
It is clear from this description that the definition of overhead workers is 
not consistent across sectors; in particular, the definitions for mining and 
manufacturing are much more restrictive than those for the other sectors. 
Hours  per worker  (H): While the employment data are quite satisfactory, 
the hours data are more troublesome. Again, the primary reliance has been 
on establishment data. For  six industries (mining, construction, durable 
and nondurable manufacturing, trade, and FIRE3), there are continuous 
time  series for  average weekly hours  of  production  or  nonsupervisory 
workers. I have followed other analysts in assuming that the hours of non- 
production workers parallel those of production workers.4 
Nonproduction  workers accounted for a fraction of  all workers that 
ranged from 8 percent in trade to 17 percent in nondurable manufacturing 
and FIRE in 1947, and from 11 percent in trade to 28 percent in durable 
manufacturing in  1971. Hence, the omission of hours of nonproduction 
workers is unlikely to be a serious problem. Nonetheless, the upward trend 
in  the fraction of  nonproduction workers may lead to  some  structural 
changes, and the available evidence indicates that in the last decade the 
workweek for  nonproduction  workers has  not  experienced the  decline 
noted in the average workweek (see Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook 
of Labor Statistics, 1971, Table 76). 
2. U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Handbook  of Methods  for  Surveys and 
Studies,  Bulletin 1711  (1971), p. 19. 
3. FIRE is composed of the finance,  insurance,  and real estate industries. 
4. Ibid., p. 215. The exception  is manufacturing,  for which a series  for hours of non- 
production  workers has been patched together. Given the fragmentary  nature of the 
evidence  on nonproduction  workers,  however,  I have used only the series for production 
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For five industries-transportation,  communication,  public utilities, 
services,  and  government-the  published  data  are  available  only  since  1964. 
For services  and government  for years  prior  to 1964,  I have  used  the series 
constructed  by Kendrick.5  Values for omitted  years were linearly  inter- 
polated, and spliced  to the published  series  at 1964.  For transportation, 
communication,  and  public  utilities,  I relied  on the  crude  technique  of using 
a fixed-weight  index of hours  for the industrial  sector  (mining  and manu- 
facturing)  as a substitute  up to 1964.  Although  this probably  is not a good 
estimate  for these  industries,  they  are  sufficiently  small  so that  the aggregate 
prediction  is little affected.  For agriculture  I have used the implicit  esti- 
mates for the BLS productivity studies (Handbook  of Labor Statistics, 1971, 
Table  82). This series  is conceptually  defective,  since  it is on a labor  force 
rather  than  an establishment  basis. 
Manhours  (E): Manhours  are  the  product  of total  employment  and  hours 
per worker,  each measured  at a weekly  rate. 
Gross  product  (X): Gross  product  by industry  is from  NIA Table 1.21, 
with historical  data from the Survey  of Current  Business,  Vol. 47 (April 
1967).  Aggregate  gross  national  product  (GNP) equals  the sum of the in- 
dustry  totals plus the discrepancy. 
Deflators  for gross product (P): Same sources as X. 
A few words  are in order  about the output  and price  series.  (The basic 
discussion  is contained  in U.S. Office  of Business  Economics,  "GNP by 
Major  Industries:  Concepts  and  Methods,"  April  1966;  processed;  also see 
John W. Kendrick, ed., The Industrial Composition  of Income and Product, 
Studies  in Income  and  Wealth,  Vol. 32, Columbia  University  Press  for the 
National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1968.)  The gross  product  series  is 
an attempt  to develop  complete  measures  of industrial  origin  of GNP. The 
series  starts  on the income  side of the account,  with  real  output  derived  by 
deflation.  The ideal  technique  of deflation  is the method  known  as "double 
deflation,"  or deflation  of both gross  outputs  and  inputs,  but in fact  double 
deflation  is used only for farms,  manufacturing,  gas and electric  utilities, 
and railroads.  In the other  cases,  the deflator  was for gross  output. 
In principle,  the deflation  procedure  in the industrial  account  is at least 
partially  independent  of the deflation  in the product  account.  It is slightly 
encouraging,  therefore,  to see that the published  statistical  discrepancy  is 
not too large. 
5. John W. Kendrick,  "Postwar  Productivity  Trends  in the United States,  1948-1969" 
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Total unemployment  rate, establishment  basis (U):  The unemployment 
rate  in the  present  study  uses  a slightly  different  definition  from  the conven- 
tional labor force definition.  The establishment  labor force is defined  as 
total employment  plus  the estimated  number  of unemployed  from  the  labor 
force  survey.  This  concept  is used  mainly  for convenience  in projection,  but 
also because  it includes  the armed  forces. 
Normal unemployment  rate (Unorm):  The normal  unemployment  rate is 
simply  the average  of the establishment  concept  of the unemployment  rate, 
4.4 percent,  which corresponds  to about 4.7 percent  on the conventional 
unemployment  measure. 
Normal  GNP  (XN): The following  output  equation  is used to generate 
normal  output: 
log(GNP)  = 
6.1565 +  0.03676t -  2.930(Ut -  Unorm)  +  0.1645(Ut-1 -  Unorm). 
(0.00042)  (0.302)  (0.306) 
Standard  error  of estimate  =  0.0141; Durbin-Watson  statistic  =  1.19; 
annual data, 1948-71. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
The  unemployment  rate  is the establishment  concept  discussed  above.  Nor- 
mal output  simply  corrects  GNP by the estimated  cyclical  effects: 
log(XN)  =  log(GNP) +  2.930(Ut -  Uno,)-  0.1645(Ut l- U-Orm). 
According  to this concept,  output  was 3.3 percent  below normal  in 1971. 
Capacity utilization  (Xi/XNi):  The approach employed here to measure 
the pressure  of demand in given industries  uses the "normal  output" 
concept.6 
Wage-weighted  employment.  The  test of importance  of demographic  fac- 
tors  was  seriously  hampered  by insufficient  data.  The  basic  data  for this  test 
were the fractions  of female  employees  in an industry.  Data sources  for 
these  series  were  as follows: 
For agriculture,  services,  and the aggregate,  Manpower  Report  of the 
President,  1971,  Tables  A-1, A-2, and  A-il. 
For all other industries, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1971, Tables 38 
and  43. 
6. For a comparison  of this with other approaches,  see Frank de Leeuw, "The Con- 
cept of Capacity,"  Journal  of the American  Statistical  Association,  Vol. 57 (December 
1962), pp. 826-40, and Measures  of Productive  Capacity,  Hearings  before the Subcom- 
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The  test of the hypothesis  proceeds  as follows:  It is assumed  that  workers 
of industry  i have  productivity  per  person-hour  of Ai. It is further  assumed 
that  productivities  are  in proportion  to gross  hourly  earnings. 
The actual  change  is to use "male-equivalent"  employment,  ET*,  where 
this  is defined  as  ET* = ETmai,e  +  0.56 ETfma,e  The  weight  of 0.56  assigned 
to female  employment  is that  for total money  earnings  for year-round  full- 
time  workers  for 1969,  from  U.S. Bureau  of the Census,  Current  Population 
Reports,  "Income  in 1969 of Families  and Persons  in the United States," 
Series  P-60,  No. 75 (1970),  Table  52. 
Capital  (K): The concept  of capital  uses the net capital  stock  from  U.S. 
Office  of Business  Economics,  "Fixed  Nonresidential  Business  Capital  in 
the United  States,  1925-1970"  (November  1971;  processed;  reproduced  by 
National  Technical  Information  Service).  The  exact  concept  is net stocks of 
privately  owned  equipment  and structures,  in 1958  dollars,  using straight- 
line depreciation,  with 85 percent  of the service  lives given by the U.S. 
Treasury  Department's  Bulletin  "F"  (revised,  1942),  constant  cost 1 version, 
as described in Fixed Nonresidential  Capital. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Barry  Bosworth:  The notion that output  mix is an important  determinant 
of aggregate  productivity  growth  is certainly  not novel,  but the conclusion 
of this paper  that a large  and accelerating  shift  has occurred  toward  indus- 
tries  with  low productivity  levels  is striking.  Nordhaus  develops  some  con- 
vincing  evidence  that,  because  of these  shifts,  the overall  trend  rate  of pro- 
ductivity  growth  in the U.S. economy  may  be slowing.  It is also interesting 
that the dominant  effect  is the shift between  industries  with high and low 
levels of productivity  rather  than between  industries  with high and low 
rates  of productivity  growth. 
A related  issue is the effort  made to explain  why productivity  slowed 
down so drastically  in 1969  and 1970  and to determine  whether  that was 
some abnormality  or a normal  cyclical occurrence.  On the surface,  this 
study seems to be quite successful  in explaining  those years, since the 
errors  of Nordhaus'  disaggregated  model were not larger  than they had 
been in some previous  periods.  But this conclusion  is in part  the result  of 
very large standard  errors  even in the basic disaggregated  equations.  An 
error  of 1 percent  in predicting  productivity  is a serious  mistake;  it corre- 
sponds  to an error  of approximately  1 percentage  point on the unemploy- 
ment  rate. 
A few aspects  of the methodology  in this paper  trouble  me. The proce- 
dure  used for the cyclical  correction  seems  unnecessarily  crude  in view of 
the existing  empirical  literature  on labor  demand  functions.  Several  statis- 
tical  biases  arise  through  the use of the unemployment  rate  to adjust  actual 
output,  and thereby  estimate  normal  output,  in an equation  explaining  a 
basic determinant  of the unemployment  rate. For example,  in a year  like 
1969, when the growth  in productivity  was lower than anticipated,  the 
unemployment  rate  was by definition  lower  than anticipated.  The cyclical 
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correction  using  that unemployment  rate then understates  normal  output 
and hence the output gap. The result is a prediction  that productivity 
growth  will not be much depressed,  which  conflicts  with the low rate of 
growth  that  is observed.  In a formal  sense,  the error  term  in these  equations 
is strongly  and directly  correlated  with an independent  variable.  As a re- 
sult, the equations  are likely to underestimate  the cyclical  effects  on pro- 
ductivity.  In my  judgment,  the errors  in the relationship  between  actual 
output  and  unemployment  should  not have  been  included  in the definition 
of normal  aggregate  output  (much  as Nordhaus  omitted  them  in estimating 
the normal output of individual  industries).  Apparently,  Nordhaus  in- 
cluded the residuals  to reflect  variations  in factors such as labor force 
growth,  but these  could  have  been  treated  directly  in the equation. 
If the primary  interest  is on the trend  term,  the problem  of estimating 
the cyclical  component  of productivity  may be of small moment.  But a 
poor cyclical  estimate  may impede  the attempt  to identify  the influence  of 
other  factors,  such as capital  stock and the demographic  mix of the labor 
force;  and  it can  seriously  cloud  analysis  of the sharp  falloff  in productivity 
growth  in 1969  and 1970.  It is difficult  to reconcile  the results  for the recent 
period  with those of other  investigators-Eckstein  and Wilson,  Fair, and 
the Wharton  and Fed-MIT-Penn  models.  For example,  the labor  demand 
equations  of the last two models  substantially  underestimate  employment 
and thus overestimate  productivity  in 1969  and 1970. 
I doubt  the wisdom  of applying  the statistical  model  to agriculture  and 
government.  Productivity  growth in government  is zero by definition: 
Output  is measured  by labor  input.  In fact,  because  of some  mix  effect  from 
a change  in the distribution  among  different  types of government  employ- 
ment, the measured  growth  in government  productivity  is not precisely 
zero; but as Nordhaus'  results  show, it is neither  sizable  nor meaningful. 
I prefer  to focus on the behavior  of productivity  in the private  nonfarm 
sector.  The overall  shift  effects  reported  in this paper  are  far  less important 
in private  nonfarm  productivity  than  in GNP productivity.  I find  the slow- 
down in the growth of private  nonfarm  productivity  in 1969 and 1970 
puzzling;  those years dominated  the results  of the period from 1965 to 
1970. Nordhaus'  own results suggest  something  abnormal  in those two 
years: Most of the ten private  nonfarm  industries  have positive  residuals 
in his Table  5, indicating  that  actual  productivity  was  lower  than  predicted. 
When  aggregated,  these  residuals  do not produce  a sizable  overestimate  of 
productivity  because  a substantial  and heavily  weighted  negative  residual William  D. Nordhaus  539 
for services  helps  to balance  out the calculation.  But the determination  of 
productivity  in the service  sector  is extremely  hazardous. 
In general,  severe  weaknesses  inherent  in industry  data on output and 
manhours  urge  caution  in viewing  Nordhaus'  results.  I am not comfort- 
able with the explanation  in this paper  that finance,  insurance,  and real 
estate  account  for an important  and prolonged  slowdown  in private  non- 
farm  productivity,  and yet that tricky  sector  is the key to the verdict  when 
agriculture  and government  are excluded. 
Robert  Solow: The  main  result  of Nordhaus'  paper  is that  the recent  slow- 
down in the rate of change  of productivity  is primarily  a consequence  of 
changes  in the composition  of output  toward  industries  with  low levels of 
productivity.  Relatively  speaking,  a deceleration  of the shift from agricul- 
ture  to the rest  of the economy  has the same  effect  as a shift  toward  indus- 
tries  with  low levels  of productivity.  The  increase  in aggregate  productivity 
that has been the result  of the shift out of agriculture  must diminish  be- 
cause  so little agricultural  employment  remains  to move out. 
The second point in the paper  is that the shift to sectors  of low pro- 
ductivity  is likely  to continue  until 1980,  so that productivity  growth  may 
slow a bit more.  Hence, potential  output  will not grow as fast over the 
next ten years  as it did during  the past ten, or even  during  the past five. 
One  important  feature  of the findings  is that little or no permanent  pro- 
ductivity  gain is to be had from a higher  utilization  rate, and hence no 
significant  productivity  windfall  is to be picked  up in the current  recovery. 
The main  question  that I want  to discuss  is how to connect  Nordhaus'  re- 
sults  with  George  Perry's  contrasting  prediction  of a high  rate  of growth  of 
potential  output over the next decade.  In addition  to cyclical  and unex- 
plained  factors,  Perry  attributes  the recent  slowdown  in productivity  to 
shifts  in the demographic  composition  of employment  toward  women  and 
the young, who themselves  have low levels of productivity-at least as 
measured  by wage rates.  Perry  expects  a stop in that kind of shift in the 
demographic  composition  of the labor  force  and,  along  with  it, in the lower 
rate of growth  of productivity.  So he concludes  that a higher  rate of pro- 
ductivity  increase  will resume. 
These  two stories  are obviously  incompatible  in the sense  that one pre- 
dicts a deceleration  of potential  output  and the other  does not. The con- 
nection  between  the two is that the industries  with low productivity,  such 
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most of the women when the share of women in total employment  in- 
creases.  Perry  implies  that when  the demographic  composition  of employ- 
ment stabilizes,  the shift to low-productivity  employment  will stop. In 
contrast  with Perry's  demographic  view of the world,  Nordhaus  stresses 
the shift in industrial  composition.  He sees service  and government  jobs 
as low-productivity  jobs, quite apart from the demographic  peculiarity 
that women  get absorbed  into them. So long as the industrial  shift con- 
tinues, so will the slowdown.  Nordhaus  implies  that even if adult men 
move into services  and government  they will have low-productivity  jobs, 
while Perry  presumes  that as adult men move into these industries,  they 
will bring  with  them  the higher  productivity  that  goes along  with  their  age- 
sex characteristics.  In part,  the outcome  depends  on techniques  of measure- 
ment. If, in fact, more  high-wage  adult  men take  jobs in the government 
and service  industries,  will that show up as an increase  in productivity  or 
will it merely  be deflated  out as a more rapid  wage  increase? 
Perhaps  the relationship  between  levels  of productivity  among  industries 
and their age-sex  employment  mix explains  Nordhaus'  failure  to confirm 
the role of changing  demography  at the industry  level.  Or  perhaps  the data 
are so deficient  that nothing can be proved in the time series within 
industries. 
On a more  technical  issue, I am puzzled  by Nordhaus'  estimates  of the 
relationship  between  productivity  and utilization.  In the aggregate  pro- 
ductivity  equation  described  in Table 1, the sum of the two regression 
coefficients  (current  and lagged) on the logarithm  of the utilization  rate 
for GNP add up to slightly  more  than one. If the sum of those  coefficients 
were exactly  one, then productivity  would be independent  of the unem- 
ployment  rate  in the long run.  Moreover,  we reach  that  long run  after  only 
a one-year  temporary  catchup.  If the unemployment  rate falls from one 
constant  level to another,  productivity  would get an extra push for one 
year,  but  then  it would  come  back  to its previous  path.  If the point  estimate 
of 1.06  were  taken  seriously  (which  it should  not be in terms  of the stan- 
dard  errors),  a decline  in the unemployment  rate below "normal"  would 
be expected  to reduce  productivity  a bit in the long run.  Other  researchers 
have generally  found a permanent-or at least much more enduring- 
addition  to productivity  from  lower  unemployment.  Nordhaus  himself  gets 
that result for most of the individual  industries  that show cyclical  pro- 
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permanent  one-time  gain in productivity  in response  to an increase  in the 
utilization  rate. 
Finally,  I am  just a bit uncomfortable  that the paper  does not describe 
the projected  movement  of relative  prices among industries  during  the 
coming  decade.  The projections  of output  and employment  shares  among 
industries  depend  on wage behavior  exogenous  to the model and the re- 
sulting  price  behavior.  It would  be a help if one could evaluate  the plausi- 
bility  of those projections  and the sensitivity  of the aggregate  productivity 
prediction  to them. 
Beatrice  N. Vaccara:  I found the paper  interesting  because  it attempts  to 
do many of the same things that we are now pursuing  in the Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis  in attempts  to measure  the effects  of industrial  shifts 
on the aggregate  level of productivity  growth. We are using sixty-five 
industries,  and would  like to disaggregate  even further  if such detail  were 
available.  Our  work  makes  me skeptical  of the meaning  of industrial  shifts 
observed  when  the economy  is split  into only twelve  sectors.  We find  more 
differences  between  component  industries  in nondurable  manufacturing 
than among  many  of the twelve  sectors  Nordhaus  studies.  Because  we dis- 
aggregate  more  finely  and because  our methods  are entirely  different,  it is 
very  difficult  to track  down  the reasons  for  the differences  between  our  con- 
clusions  and  those of this  paper. 
Our  findings  would  confirm  Nordhaus'  view  that  the rate  of productivity 
growth  slowed  markedly  in 1965-71  as compared  with 1948-55.  But  we be- 
lieve  the slowdown  can  be seen  in most of the individual  industries,  not  just 
in the mix.  In fact,  in some  cases  the aggregate  for the sectors  tends  to dis- 
guise  the slowdown.  The aggregate  of nondurable  manufacturing,  for ex- 
ample,  shows  very  little  slowdown,  but that  is primarily  due  to shifts  of the 
mix  within  the sector.  Among  the individual  nondurable  manufacturing  in- 
dustries,  only 20 percent  of the output  in 1970  was accounted  for by indus- 
tries  that  did  not experience  a slowdown.  Our  averages  and  profiles  for each 
of the  broader  sectors  are  similar  to Nordhaus'  except  for services,  where  we 
get a quite  different  result:  We do not find  a recent  speedup  in productivity 
there. 
Our results  have not been corrected  for cyclical  influences  because,  in 
our  judgment,  we have not developed  a satisfactory  procedure  to do so. 
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ployment  mix had been  held  constant  for the sixty-five  industries.  We find 
that the change  in the mix accounts  for about  45 percent  of the slowdown 
in productivity  growth  for the economy  as a whole, and about  35 percent 
of the slowdown  in the private  economy.  The  difference  between  45 and 35 
percent  reveals  that  the shift  to government  is an important  element  of the 
change  in the mix. Our studies  suggest  that, compared  with constancy  of 
employment  shares,  it is primarily  shifts  in the mix toward  industries  with 
slower rates of productivity  growth that retard aggregate  productivity 
rather  than  shifts  toward  industries  with  lower  levels.  This  is the reverse  of 
Nordhaus'  finding  that level effects  predominate,  but the difference  may 
reflect,  in part,  his focus on mix shifts  relative  to constant  output  (rather 
than employment)  shares. 
I want  to discuss  what  Nordhaus  calls the graveyard-the FIRE sector 
of the economy  (finance,  insurance,  real  estate).  The  current-dollar  estimate 
of product  originating  in the  FIRE  area  is not unusual  or particularly  poor. 
The deflator  for that area  is essentially  a residual,  a fact that impairs  the 
measurement  of real product.  But the error  resulting  from the residual 
procedure  is probably  no more  than one-half  of one percent,  and  it should 
not trend  upward  or downward  over  time;  therefore,  it cannot  significantly 
alter  the estimated  rate  of growth  of output  or productivity.  Nor does im- 
puted rent account  for a slowdown.  Even when FIRE excludes  imputed 
rent, a marked  slowdown  remains  in the rate of productivity  growth- 
indeed,  an actual  decline  in productivity  appears:  In the  period  1948-55  the 
rate  of productivity  growth  for FIRE excluding  imputed  rent was -0.10; 
for the period  1965-71  it was -  1.52. 
Nordhaus also suspects  that the productivity  slowdown observed  in 
construction  may  stem  from  defects  in the deflator.  If anything,  the defects 
of deflation  disguise  the slowdown.  The method  of pricing  residential  con- 
struction  was  changed  in 1964,  and  since  then construction  output  is prob- 
ably  understated  to a lesser  extent  than  previously. 
General  Discussion 
Saul  Hymans  commented  on the difficulty  of estimating  the influence  of 
capital on labor productivity.  Nordhaus found a negative sign on the 
capital variable,  which implies-totally unreasonably--that  increases  in 
capital  reduce  productivity.  Hymans  suggested  that,  in line with  the experi- William  D. Nordhaus  543 
ence  with  the Michigan  model,  lagging  investment  might  remove  the para- 
dox. In that  model,  it takes  almost  a year  for new  capital  to start  benefiting 
labor  productivity;  for a couple  of quarters  it tends  to reduce  productivity, 
perhaps  because  of a learning  phenomenon  or set-up  and  installation  costs. 
Hymans  also felt that Nordhaus'  test of the Perry  demographic  variable 
was a bit unfair statistically.  If Perry  is correct,  weighted  employment 
should be the dependent  variable  in the relationship  of employment  to 
output. Testing its role as an independent  variable  can produce  biased 
estimates  because,  if Perry  is right, weighted  employment  is necessarily 
correlated  with the error  term. 
William  Fellner  explored  further  the connection  between  industrial  com- 
position and the demography  of employment.  If the supply  of relatively 
low-wage  workers  stops  increasing  in relation  to that of higher-wage  work- 
ers, will the shift of employment  toward  lower-wage  industries  continue? 
Will the wage rates  of women  and teenagers  rise relative  to those of men 
as a result  of shifts  in relative  labor  supplies?  If so, will there  be a corre- 
sponding  change  in relative  productivities  so that any  rise  in the wage  rates 
of women  and  teenagers  will  be matched  by increased  productivity?  Fellner 
suggested  that one set of answers  to these  questions  would  justify  the Perry 
projection  of high productivity  growth  and another  would point to the 
Nordhaus  verdict  of a slowdown.  In this connection,  Perry  reported  that 
Edward  Denison had not found much variation  in the relative  wages of 
various  demographic  groups  over  long periods  of time, despite  significant 
variations  in relative  supply. 
A number  of participants  raised  questions  about  the small  (and, in the 
aggregate  case, transitory)  cyclical  impact  on productivity  that Nordhaus 
found.  In response,  Nordhaus  agreed  that  he believed  his equations  tended 
to understate  the amount of cyclical  correction  and the duration  of the 
cyclical  effect  in the aggregate.  On the other  hand,  Nordhaus  emphasized, 
his cyclical  productivity  relationship  still left room for a very substantial 
Okun's  law coefficient,  since  labor  force  participation  and  the length  of the 
workweek  could be strongly responsive  to  changes in unemployment. 
Moreover,  Nordhaus  defended  his procedure  as a lesser  evil  than  the alter- 
native assumption  that normal  output  grew uniformly  at an exponential 
rate. Such an assumption  would produce  biases  in the other  direction  by 
attributing  to  cyclical fluctuations  output changes that resulted from 
variations  in the growth  of the labor  force or in the trend  of productivity 
itself. 544  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
R. A. Gordon was troubled  by the discussion  of cyclical effects.  He 
pointed  out that the 1961-69  expansion  was so much  longer  than  previous 
postwar  cycles that cyclical relationships  had to be basically different. 
R. J. Gordon  felt that the impact  on productivity  of changing  utilization 
rates  is not really  a cyclical  phenomenon  but a rate-of-growth  phenome- 
non; productivity  grows  fastest  early  in an expansion  when output  grows 
rapidly.  Lawrence  Klein suggested  that the treatment  of the government 
sector  could  and  should  be refined  by the  profession  so that  it could  discard 
the unrealistic  assumption  of zero productivity  growth. In those areas 
where  specific  outputs  can be defined  and government  productivity  can be 
measured,  there  is evidence  that government  is not a sector of low pro- 
ductivity  growth.  Klein added  that the compulsory  draft  into the armed 
services  during  the 1965-71  period  could  have dragged  down productivity 
figures  as they are  now constructed.  In fact,  many  fairly  productive  people 
were  put into the army  at the low wages  of a draftee  and these  wages  were 
taken as a measure  of their  productivity.  The introduction  of a volunteer 
army  should  correct  some of this distortion  in the data. 
Arthur  Okun  noted the more optimistic  view held by Edward  Denison 
and  other  observers  that  the  recent  productivity  slowdown  may  be-at  least 
for nonfarm  business-entirely  an unusually  pronounced  cyclical  reaction 
with little long-term  significance.  The productivity  optimists  believe  that 
labor  demand  in recent  years  may have  been bolstered  by the longevity  of 
the previous  expansion  that R. A. Gordon  had mentioned,  particularly  by 
employers'  prolonged  experience  with tight labor markets  in the middle 
and late 1960s.  The optimists  see the productivity  slowdown  primarily  as 
a 1969-70  phenomenon  rather  than one starting  in 1965.  Joseph  Pechman 
wondered  whether  the 1972 rebound  in productivity  might support  the 
productivity  optimists. Nordhaus reported  that the 1972 performance 
could not be appraised  yet in terms of his disaggregated  model, but his 
aggregate  model  showed  no unusual  rebound  for the first  half of the year. 
Franco  Modigliani  explored  the  welfare  implications  of the productivity 
slowdown that Nordhaus foresaw. He argued that differences  in pro- 
ductivity  among  industries  had to result  from  basic differences  in the fac- 
tors employed  in those industries:  differential  abilities  in the work force, 
differential  amounts of investment  in physical  or in human capital, or 
different  degrees  of monopoly  power. If shifts in the pattern  of demand 
pushed output and employment  in the direction  of industries  that have 
lower productivity  levels because  they require  either  less physical  capital William  D. Nordhaus  545 
or less human  capital,  the result  would  be recorded  as a slowdown  in pro- 
ductivity  growth,  but it would  not necessarily  mean  that society  would  be 
worse  off. Offsetting  the slower  growth  in output  per manhour  would  be a 
reduced  requirement  for investment.  So far as Modigliani  could see, the 
only types  of slowdown  in productivity  due to shifts  in the mix that really 
meant  the nation  would  be worse  off would  be those that resulted  because 
the workers  had less ability  or because  they had less opportunity  to use 
their  ability. 